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CONTRACT REVIEW: COGNITIVE BIAS, MORAL
HAZARD, AND SITUATIONAL PRESSURE
ERIC A. ZACKS*
This Article explores the contract drafting and review process of
attorneys from a cognitive and social science perspective. Based on an
understanding of the behavioral tendencies of individual attorneys as
impacted by cognitive bias, moral hazard, and situational pressure, the
drafting attorney may be able to secure particular transactional advantages
for her client. For example, the anchoring effect, which suggests that
individuals are affected by the presence by an initial value position, may
explain why drafters should and do include extreme positions in their initial
draft. Similarly, time pressure may affect an attorney's review of a contract,
which a drafting attorney can anticipate and exploit to her advantage by
increasing contract length and complexity. The drafting attorney can also
seek to take advantage of particular moral hazards that the reviewing
attorney faces when representing clients, such as when the reviewing
attorney is compensated on a per-transaction basis or would like to appease
the client and avoid disrupting a transaction. Understanding the cognitive
processes and situational influences helps explain or predict particular
patterns of contracting behavior. These factors suggest significant
limitations in the attorney as an effective tool in checking opportunistic
behavior, both prior to and after contract formation, and undermine a
positive model of the transactional attorney as a value-adding transaction
cost engineer.
"Lawyers function as transaction cost engineers, devising efficient
mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing theory's
hypothetical world of perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of
effecting transactions in this world."
-Ronald J. Gilson1
Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. J.D., Harvard
Law School, 2002; B.A., University of Michigan, 1998. I am grateful to Hila
Keren, Justin Long, Christopher Lund, and Dustin Zacks for helpful comments and
suggestions during earlier drafts, and to Weiling Chou and Christine Flott for
fantastic research assistance.
1 Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills andAsset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984).
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"It's too light. It feels like a 'C.' Bulk it up and add a few multicolored
graphs."
-Rodney Dangerfield 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Drafting and reviewing a written contract is already understood to
be a complicated and complex process. Not only are the attorneys charged
with doing so expected to reflect accurately the agreed-upon promises of
the two parties, but they also are expected to address possible (and
sometimes unforeseeable) contingencies, ensure legal enforceability of the
document, protect the client from opportunistic behavior of the other party
once the contract has been signed, and address dispute resolution issues,
among a myriad of other issues. In this view, the attorneys preparing and
reviewing the contract are charged with getting "the deal right" and making
sure the contract is "legal."3 Attorneys also may add value as "transaction
cost engineers" responsible for minimizing transaction costs or market
inefficiencies that could disrupt the transaction.4
The traditional accounts, however, of the role of the contracts
attorney ignore the human element involved with contract review and
revision. The reviewing attorney is a human being, which means that the
drafting attorney needs to understand how individuals make decisions and
judgments. Different characteristics and situations may suggest different
strategies for the attorney preparing the draft of a contract. Knowledge of
human decision-making behavior and processes as well as the variation
within transaction contexts could be invaluable to effective representation
of one's client, but more importantly, may help explain current contracting
behavior. There also may be inherent constraints that prevent an attorney
from utilizing any information or control advantages to her client's
advantage.
2 BACK TO SCHOOL (Paper Clip Productions 1986).
3 George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 Bus. L. 279,
286 (2009) [hereinafter Dent, Business Lawyers] ("Gilson highlights the role of
lawyers in producing and verifying information .... [C]lients rationally pay lawyers
(and other agents, like accountants) big fees for this service."); Gilson, supra note
1, at 242 ("When my question-what does a business lawyer really do-is put to
business lawyers, the familiar response is that they 'protect' their clients, that they
get their clients the 'best' deal."); Jason M. Klein, No Foolfor A Client: The
Finance and Incentives Behind Stock-Based Compensation for Corporate
Attorneys, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 329, 348 (1999) [hereinafter J.M. Klein]
("While the cynic may say that the lawyer has crafted the law so as to provide
guaranteed employment for lawyers, the more astute observer may comment that
the law has crafted lawyers so as to provide guarantees for clients.").
4 Gilson, supra note 1.
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The drafting party might be able to gain advantages in the initial
draft if the decision-making process of individuals is understood. Based on
the predictable and systematic cognitive biases and judgment heuristics of
the opposing attorney, the drafting party also may be able to draft in her
client's favor. For example, understanding the anchoring effect, which
suggests that individuals are affected by the presence by an initial position,
as well as the status quo bias, may be instructive to drafting attorneys as
they prepare the initial position of the parties in the contract.
In addition, drafting and reviewing the contract also should be
understood as occurring within the larger context of a negotiation. As such,
the in Vial draft of the contract is an important starting point for the
negotiations that may occur following the opposing party's receipt of the
draft. The drafting attorney, therefore, needs to be conscious of the
negotiation process that likely will follow based on the transaction context.
For example, if the attorney is preparing a contract that will be sent to an
opposing party without an experienced attorney or to an opposing party
with less bargaining power, then the drafting attorney might expect the
negotiation process to be short or non-existent. Accordingly, the drafting
attorney may prepare a more one-sided contract with the expectation of
little resistance.
Moreover, the drafting party needs to be cognizant of the
situational pressures that can influence each individual involved in the
contract review process. For example, if there is time pressure to execute
the contract (to get the deal done) on one or more of the clients involved in
the transaction, then the drafting attorney should prepare a draft that reflects
the time advantage or disadvantage of her client. If time is on her client's
side, then it may be possible to prepare a more one-sided contract, as the
opposing party may put pressure on its attorney to accept all but the most
important terms as drafted. Similarly, the reviewing attorney also may face
a moral hazard when she reviews the initial draft. If the reviewing attorney
is more concerned with pleasing the client and not appearing to be an
obstructionist to the transaction, or if the reviewing attorney is being
compensated on a per-transaction as opposed to an hourly basis, there may
be reasons that the reviewing attorney will scrutinize the contract less
thoroughly. There are innumerable variations of the different negotiating
context and situational pressures, and a drafting attorney should be
cognizant of how these variations should be factored into the initial draft of
the contract.
Scholarship concerning contract design, however, has not
addressed the impact or situation of the initial draft of the written contract
upon the opposing attorney. Some have focused on the ability of contracts
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to influence the non-drafting contract party when executing a contract.5
Similarly, I have argued that contracts may be prepared to exploit the
cognitive biases and decision-making processes of adjudicators.6 This
Article instead focuses on contract preparation in contemplation that an
attorney will be on the other side reviewing one's draft. I argue that there
are many situational and cognitive factors to be considered when drafting a
contract for review by the opposing counsel and that the potential impact of
such factors should not be ignored or understated. Without understanding
the decision-making process of the individual attorneys that review a
contract draft, one is left with an incomplete understanding of contracts and
contracting behavior.
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows: Section II describes
three different traditional explanations of the role of the contract drafting
and reviewing attorney. These explanations, however, do not completely
account for the imperfect human elements involved in contract review.
Section III describes how the reviewing attorney may be susceptible to
different cognitive biases and judgment heuristics, which can be anticipated
by the drafting attorney. Next, Section IV examines how, in a related
manner, situational pressures and moral hazards may exist for the reviewing
attorney. These pressures and moral hazards, as with systematic decision-
making processes, may provide the drafting attorney with the opportunity to
draft strategically or opportunistically. This Article then addresses various
constraints on strategic or opportunistic drafting in Section V. Section VI
concludes by examining the significant implications of strategic drafting for
existing models of the transactional attorney.
II. THE ROLE OF ATTORNEYS IN CONTRACT DRAFTING AND REVIEW
Before considering possible contract drafting scenarios, it is useful
to consider the traditional views regarding the role of the attorneys involved
in drafting and reviewing contracts. These views consider the relevance of
transaction costs and economic agency, which help explain the use of
attorneys in these situations as well as the underlying structure of the
relationship between opposing parties' attorneys.
5 See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1203 (2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for
Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REv. 1165 (2003).
6 Eric A. Zacks, Contracting Blame, 15 U. PA. J. BuS. L. 169, 171 (2012)
[hereinafter E.A. Zacks, Blame].
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A. Engineering Transaction Costs
Contract preparation and review by attorneys can be understood as
part of the attorney's role as manager of the transaction costs inherent in
any exchange between two parties . Gilson used the term "transaction cost
engineers" to describe the role that business lawyers can play to add
increase overall transaction value by reducing transactional inefficiencies.8
These inefficiencies arise from the real-world exceptions to the theoretical
assumptions of a perfect market, including the assumption the parties to a
transaction have a common time horizon, the same expectations, have
access to available information, and have no transaction costs.9 In reality, of
course, these are often barriers to closing the deal. 0 Value is created when
lawyers allow for the parties to close the deal by lessening or fixing these
market imperfections and allow the assumptions to be accurate."
One way for lawyers to address these market imperfections is
through contracts.' 2 For example, when selling a business, the seller and
buyer may have different opinions regarding the future prospects of the
business and be unable to agree on a purchase price. A lawyer could add
value (and permit a transaction to occur) by ameliorating this difference in
opinion through an "earnout" contract or provision to condition payment on
7 Gilson, supra note 1 (suggesting "that the tie between legal skills and transaction
value is the business lawyer's ability to create a transactional structure which
reduces transaction costs and therefore results in more accurate asset pricing");
Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REv. 77, 77 (2011)
(noting that "we think of lawyers only as the proverbial 'transaction cost
engineers,' the loyal agents of parties to the transaction"). Transaction costs include
discovering "who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one
wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain,
to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the
terms of the contract are being observed, and so on." R. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1, 15 (1960).
8 Gilson, supra note 1; J.M. Klein, supra note 3, at 350 ("[B]y serving as a
transaction cost engineer, the lawyer reduces the overall costs of doing a deal and
allows the deal to be valued with greater clarity.").
9 Gilson, supra note 1, at 253.
1o Id.; Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?,
74 OR. L. REv. 239, 240 (1995) [hereinafter L. Bernstein] (suggesting that lawyers
can play many different roles to assist the parties to overcome barriers to
transactions, including by "counseling," "dealmaking," "matchmaking,"
"gatekeeping, "proselytizing," or "conciliating").
Gilson, supra note 1, at 253-54; J.M. Klein, supra note 3, at 349 ("Lawyers add
value to clients by recognizing this tension [arising from legal enforcement
uncertainty] in the market for performance of promises and pricing it accordingly
into the promise itself, resulting in a more efficient environment in which clients
operate.").Gilson, supra note 1, at 298 ("Knowledge of alternative transactional forms and
skill at translating the desired form into appropriate documents are as central to
engineering transactions for the purpose of reducing transaction costs as for the
purpose of reducing regulatory costs.").
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future business performance. 13 In another context, the use by attorneys of
"standard contractual forms may create value by reducing transaction and
negotiating costs, reducing the likelihood of transaction breakdown, and,
perhaps, increasing the amount of information about particular parties'
willingness to abide by community norms."' 4
From the client's view, however, attorneys may not add value but
instead represent a cost to the overall transaction. 15 Regardless of whether
one believes that attorneys add or lower overall transaction value, the
contract attorneys' role is understood to involve managing the document
governing the exchange and the exchange's process so the qgsts of
accomplishing each side's expectations, both before and after the
transaction, do not threaten the existence or occurrence of the exchange. 6
B. Addressing Post-Formation Moral Hazard
One of the roles of the contract law attorney when preparing the
written contract derives from one of the ultimate purposes of the written
contract, namely, constraining opportunistic behavior of the opposing party
after the contract has been executed. 17 The possibility of opportunistic
behavior arises based on the economic agency relationship between each
contractual promissor and promissee. 18 Once one party has been tasked
" Id. at 262-63.14 L. Bernstein, supra note 10, at 250.
15 Gilson, supra note 1, at 241-42 (noting that some view transactional lawyers "at
best as a transaction cost, part of a system of wealth redistribution from clients to
lawyers; legal fees represent a tax on business transactions to provide an income
maintenance program for lawyers").
16 Id. at 255.
17 INtS MACHO-STADLER & J. DAVID PtREZ-CASTRILLO, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS 3-4 (2d ed. 2001)
(describing the "theory of contracts under asymmetric information, a theory that
analyses the characteristics of optimal contracts and the variables that influence
those characteristics, according to the behaviour [sic] and information of the parties
to the contract"); BERNARD SALANit, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 2 (2d ed.
2005) (describing how the "theory of contracts [originates in] the failures of
general equilibrium theory," including informational asymmetry); Edward A.
Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A
Contract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189,
194 (1995) [hereinafter E.A. Bernstein] ("The real value added to the transaction is
the value of the transaction .... implemented by a contractual promise, less both the
costs incurred in placing the promise in legally enforceable form and the value of
voluntary performance.").18 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976)
("We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the
agent."); id. at 311 ("Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with
employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, etc. The problem of agency
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through the contract to perform a particular act, then from an economic
standpoint, the promissor is now the economic agent of the promissee (the
principal) empowered to perform an act for another (the promised-for
performance) and is now the agent of the other with respect to that task. 9
Because the parties' economic interests are different, the promissor
(the economic agent) may face a moral hazard and be inclined and
incentivized to act in a number of ways that are below the desired
performance level.2° Obviously, in many cases, the interests of the parties
may be different: the promissee would generally prefer a higher quality and
less remunerative performance, while the promissor would prefer a lower
quality and more remunerative arrangement.2'
costs and monitoring exists for all of these contracts."); Edgar Kiser, Comparing
Varieties ofAgency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An
Illustration from State Policy Implementation, 17 Soc. THEORY 146, 146 (1999)("Agency relations exist in a wide variety of social contexts involving the
delegation of authority, including clients and various service providers.").
19 Trond Petersen, Recent Developments in: The Economics of Organization. The
Principal-Agent Relationship, 36 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 277, 277 (1993) ("A
principal-agent relationship arises when a principal contracts with an agent to
P erform some tasks on behalf of the principal.").
0 Gregory S. Dawson, Richard T. Watson & Marie-Claude Boudreau, Information
Asymmetry in Information Systems Consulting: Toward a Theory of Relationship
Constraints, 27 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 143, 150 (2010) ("Agency theory posits that
the agent (the person performing the work) might behave opportunistically if the
agent's goals conflict with the principal's."); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18, at
308 ("If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason
to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.");
Peter Wright, Ananda Mukherji & Mark J. Kroll, A Reexamination ofAgency
Theory Assumptions: Extensions and Extrapolations, 30 J. SOCIO-ECON. 413, 415
(2001) ("Opportunism is perceived as self-interest seeking with guile .... Thus, the
expectation is that economic actors may disguise, mislead, distort, or cheat as they
Partner in an exchange.")(citation omitted).
ERiC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BuSINESs ENTITIES 90 (2d ed.
201 0)("The principal wants the task performed at the lowest cost; the agent wants
the highest remuneration with the least effort .... Measured strictly from the
principal's economic best interest, principals have an incentive to ratchet because
they get the desired task performed at a lower cost."); J6rg G. Htilsmann, The
Political Economy of Moral Hazard, I CZECH J. POLITICIK EKONOMIE 35, 37
(2006) ("[I]n the case of an agency contract, moral hazard can arise when an
economic good is not effectively controlled by its owner (the 'principal') but by a
different person called the 'agent'... .The agent, who is fully informed about his
own activities, has an incentive to act in his own material interest against the
material interests of his less informed principal."); Douglas E. Stevens & Alex
Thevaranjan, A Moral Solution to the Moral Hazard Problem, 35 ACCT., ORGS. &
Soc'Y 125, 125 (2010) ("After accepting the offer, however, the agent prefers to
shirk and provide less than the agreed-upon level of effort because he is assumed to
be effort-averse and morally insensitive (i.e., opportunistically self-interested).");
Wright, Mukherji & Kroll, supra note 20 ("In spite of provision of incentives and
monitoring, it is anticipated that opportunism may prevail because of adverse
selection or moral hazard.").
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This difference in economic interests becomes more problematic in
an agency relationship when there is a disparity between the parties'
respective amount of information and control.22 For example, a promissee
may have less information as to the qualifications of the promissor to
perform adequately in the first place. 3 The promissee may also be unable to
detect whether the promissor is performing (or did perform) as the
promissee would prefer.24 Based on the superior information of the
22 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989) (describing the "agency problem that arises when (a)
the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or
expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing"); H1llsmann,
supra note 21, at 35 ("Moral hazard is present in 'actions of economic agents [ .... ]
to the detriment of others in situations where they do not bear the full consequences
[....] of their actions. "')(citations omitted); id. ("Thus the essential feature of moral
hazard is that it incites some people A to expropriate other people B."); id. at 37
("Whenever the principal cannot effectively monitor the activities of his agent,
therefore, the latter has an incentive to increase his own (monetary and psychic)
income at the expense of the former."); Stevens & Thevaranjan, supra note 21 (The
principal-agent "model raises expectations about the occurrence of self-interested
behavior and the usefulness of financial incentives in solving the moral hazard
problem"); C. Kirabo Jackson & Henry S. Schneider, Do Social Connections
Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence From the New York City Taxi Industry, (NBER
Working Paper No. 16279, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6279
("When an economic agent does not bear the full cost or full fruit of her actions, a
moral hazard may arise in which the agent, through doing what is personally
optimal, behaves in ways that are sub-optimal from a social standpoint... ")(citation
omitted)23 Because of this disparity in information, agents may be able to misrepresent their
qualifications to the principals. MACHO-STADLER & PtREZ-CASTRILLO, supra note
17, at 11 (noting that in "adverse selection" problems, "the principal can verify the
agent's behaviour, but the optimal decision, or the cost of this decision, depends on
the agent's type, that is, on certain characteristics of the production process of
which the agent is the only informed party .... [including] personal characteristics
of the agent"); Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, Trust and
Incentives in Agency, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 43, 70 (2005) ("The purpose of
the [legal] agent is to exercise delegated authority, because the principal chooses to
act through an intermediary. Because the agent is the one actually doing the job, he
will generally have better knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
relationship."); Eisenhardt, supra note 22, at 61 ("Adverse selection refers to the
misrepresentation of ability by the agent. . . Adverse selection arises because the
principal cannot completely verify [the agent's] skills or abilities either at the time
of hiring or while the agent is working.").
24 GLENN BLACKMON, INCENTIVE REGULATION AND THE REGULATION OF
INCENTIVES 7 (1994) (describing the principal-agent problem in terms of the ability
of the agent to "take some actions that further his interests at the expense of the
principal's interests. It is difficult (i.e., expensive) to monitor or verify the behavior
of the agent"); MACHO-STADLER & PtREZ-CASTRILLO, supra note 17, at 9
(describing labor situations where, even though the agent's results are verifiable
(such as number of units sold), the agent's specific effort and time dedicated to a
task cannot be observed by the principal); Eisenhardt, supra note 22, at 58 ("The
problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved
appropriately."); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J.
ECON. 74, 74 (1979) ("The source of this moral hazard of incentive problem is an
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promissor as well as the nature of the contractual relationship in which a
task is delegated to another, the promissor often will have more control than
the promissee with respect to the quality, timing, and other parameters of
the promissor's actual performance.2 5
Based on the differences in interests, information, and control
between the parties, each promissor may be inclined and provided with the
opportunity to act in her own interests to the detriment of the promissee.2 6
asymmetry of information among individuals that results because individual
actions cannot be observed and hence contracted upon."). Peterson, supra note 19,
at 278:
The principal-agent relationship is interesting when (a) there is some
uncertainty in the way the agent's action gets transformed into the
output, and (b) there is asymmetrical information, for example, the
agent (e.g. a worker) observes her own action, but the principal (e.g.
an employer) does not observe the action of the agent. The principal
can then not be sure whether the agent acts in the principal's best
interest.
25 MACHO-STADLER & PEREZ-CASTRILLO, supra note 17, at 10, states that
problems can arise
[W]hen, before carrying out the effort for which he has been
contracted, the agent observes the result of Nature's decision but the
principal does not .... [B]efore the actual contracted action, the agent
will have some sort of informational advantage by privately
observing a relevant variable, for example, the level of effort that
would be optimal. Id.
See also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment,
58 AM. ECON. REv. 537, 538 (1968):
The principal-agent relation is very pervasive in all economies and
especially in modem ones; by definition the agent has been selected
for his specialized knowledge and therefore the principal can never
hope completely to check the agent's performance. You cannot
therefore easily take out insurance against the failure of the agent to
perform well. Id.
See also Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber, supra note 23, at 70-7 1:
The agent is often a specialist on the task he has been asked to
perform, having a comparative advantage if not an absolute
advantage relative to the principal, giving the agent greater capacity
to process information and determine the most desirable course of
action. The information asymmetry between principal and agent
brings the agent to a position of power in the relationship that makes
the principal dependent on the agent's judgments and actions. Id.
Kiser, supra note 18, at 146 ("[O]nce principals delegate authority to agents, they
often have problems controlling them, because (1) agents' interests often differ
from theirs, and (2) agents often have better information about their actions than do
principals.")..
Dawson, Watson & Boudreau, supra note 20 ("Agency theory posits that the
agent (the person performing the work) might behave opportunistically if the
agent's goals conflict with the principal's."); Htilsmann, supra note 21 ("Whenever
the principal cannot effectively monitor the activities of his agent, therefore, the
latter has an incentive to increase his own (monetary and psychic) income at the
expense of the former."); Jenson & Meckling, supra note 18, at 308 ("If both
parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to believe that
the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal."); Wright,
Mukherji & Kroll, supra note 20, at 414 ("Agency theory is rooted in economic
388 THE OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 9.2
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For example, a promissor could "shirk" or attempt to maximize the
compensation realizable from the transaction, and the promissee may not
have sufficient information to detect or control such behavior.27
Based on an understanding of the moral hazard facing promissors,
the drafting attorney may be concerned with the contract's ability to enable
detection of and constrain the opportunistic behavior by the other contract
party (that will be making contractual promises to the drafting attorney's
client).28 Contractual promises are by definition legally enforceable
promises, so the drafting attorney will want to make sure that the promised
tasks are appropriately specified, conditioned, and monitored, and that the
failure to perform such tasks is sanctioned as desired. 29  Against the
utilitarianism .... [T]he agency problem becomes more evident-if both the agent
and the principal are utility maximizers, because the presumption is that the agent
will not act in the best interests of the principal ... .")(citation omitted).
27 BLACKMON, supra note 24, at 7-8 ("It is tempting and easy to judge the agent to
be 'bad' in this situation .... Often the shorthand description of the agent's behavior
carries this negative connotation. The agent may 'shirk,' engage in 'slack,' or ...
engage in 'abuse."'); id. at 8 (noting that "the agent does not profit from his
opportunity to shirk, slack, or abuse as long as the principal anticipates the agents
[sic] opportunity to so behave"); SALANI , supra note 17, at 118 ("We speak of
moral hazard when the Agent takes a decision ('action') that affects his utility and
that of the Principal; the Principal only observes the 'outcome,' an imperfect signal
of the action taken; the action the Agent would choose spontaneously is not Pareto-
optimal."); id. ("Because the action is unobservable, the Principal cannot force the
Agent to choose an action that is Pareto-optimal."); Eisenhardt, supra note 22, at 61
("Moral hazard refers to lack of effort on the part of the agent. The argument here
is that the agent may simply not put for the agreed-upon effort. That is, the agent is
shirking.").
28 See, e.g., Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber, supra note 23, at 89 ("Economic
analysis of the agency model seeks to characterize the terms of an optimal agency
contract. Because of moral hazard, the principal must rely on performance based
rewards such as bonuses and commissions to induce the agent to work."); Dent,
Business Lawyers, supra note 3, at 287 (criticizing Gilson's "neglect of
opportunism (i.e., self-interested behavior), including agency costs," which should
be included as part of the transaction costs that lawyers seek to manage); Alex
Gershkov & Motty Perry, Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse
Selection, 79 REv. ECON. STUD. 268, 268 (2012) (discussing the relationship
between a money manager (an agent) and an investor (a principal), in particular
that "The investor's problem then is how to design an optimal compensation
contract in light of the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that arise from
the fact that the manager's quality and effort as well as the complexity of the
available investment opportunities are the manager's private information.").
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) ("A contract is a promise or
set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance
of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."); Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic
Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. Bus.
L.J. 727, 759 (2010) (examining "how contracts can be used to insure performance
and as part of a preventive legal strategy"); Eisenhardt, supra note 22, at 58 ("[T]he
focus of [agency] theory is on determining the most efficient contract governing the
principal-agent relationship given assumptions about people (e.g., self-interest,
bounded rationality, risk aversion) .... and information (e.g., information is a
commodity which can be purchased)."); Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond
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backdrop of legal enforcement of such provisions, a contract can help
alleviate disparities in information and control. 30 The role of the attorney
drafting or reviewing the contract, then, is to try to minimize such
asymmetries and to sanction opportunistic behavior through appropriate
provisions in the contract.
3
'
Unconscionability: The Case for Using "Knowing Assent" as the Basis for
Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE UNIV.
L. REv. 469, 475 (2008)("A contract may be loosely defined as a voluntary
agreement that the law will enforce."); Stefan Wuyts & Inge Geyskens, The
Formation of Buyer-Supplier Relationships: Detailed Contract Drafting and Close
Partner Selection, 69 J. MKTG. 103, 103 (2005) ("Theoretically, some researches
argue that detailed contract drafting offers a way to protect against the partner's
opportunism through the threat of legal enforcement .... whereas others argue that
detailed contracts are seldom used in practice because they are costly to draft and
enforce.... .")(citations omitted).30 DiMatteo, supra note 29, at 770 ("Contracts offer numerous ways of insuring
performance, such as the use of letters of credit to insure payment in documentary
credit transactions. The entire area of secured transactions attempts to assure a
lender that the borrower will perform."); Htilsmann, supra note 21, at 39 (noting
that "principals acting on a free market ... are also free to design contracting
relationships in ways that minimise [sic]: (a) the danger of moral hazard arising in
the first place and (b) the danger of moral hazard, once there, affecting them
negatively"); Wright, Mukherji & Kroll, supra note 20, at 425 ("In spite of
contracting, monitoring, and bonding efforts, however, there will still remain 'some
divergence between the agent's decisions and those decisions which would
maximize the welfare of the principal')(citations omitted). See also Wuyts &
Geyskens, supra note 29, at 106:
Thus, through clearly articulated clauses, contracts narrow the
domain around which parties can be opportunistic. For example....
precise statement of how each party is to perform decreases the
likelihood that the partner will hide important performance-related
information, such as information about capacity constraints. On the
other hand, failing to specify all elements of the exchange
31 contractually increases incentives for short-term cheating.
Holmstrom, supra note 24, at 74 ("A natural remedy to [the principal-agent]
problem is to invest resources into monitoring of actions and use this information
in the contract."). A contract, however, is not a perfect or inexpensive instrument.
SALANIE, supra note 17, at 109 (describing how a fixed wage contract, if given to
an agent whose actions cannot be observed by the principal, may induce "the Agent
to choose selfishly the action that is least costly for him, and this in general is not
optimal"); Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber, supra note 23, at 56 ("It can be
prohibitively costly to write complete contracts that specify the duties and
liabilities of each participant in every possible contingency. Moreover, it is costly
to monitor the agent's activities and such monitoring conflicts with the purpose of
the agent as a decision maker acting under delegated authority."); DiMatteo, supra
note 29, at 761 ("[T]he gaps and ambiguity of the [incomplete] contract allow for
more opportunistic behavior in the performance of the contract than would a more
formalized contract"); Mark Geistfeld, Manufacturer Moral Hazard and the Tort-
Contract Issue in Products Liability, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 241, 241 (1995)
("It is well known that contracting may lead to inefficient outcomes if consumers
are not perfectly informed of product risks, so the types of imperfect information
that might justify tort regulation are central to the issue of whether tort or contract
rules should allocate liability for product-caused injuries."); Benjamin Klein,
Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM.
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C. Addressing Pre-Formation Moral Hazard
Contract preparation and review by attorneys may also be utilized
because of the problematic economic agency relationship that exists
between opposing parties prior to execution of the contract. The drafting
party may be understood to be the economic agent of the other party with
respect to the task of preparing the contract, which means that the parties
again face the principal-agent problem, albeit in the pre-formation
context. 32 In this manifestation of the principal-agent problem, the drafting
party may have superior information and control with respect to
determining the contents of the contract.33 The problem may be somewhat
more acute in this instance because of the diametrically opposed interests of
the respective parties to the contract. In particular, each promissor will
desire the most flexibility in, and compensation for, such promissor's
performance, while each promissee will desire the least flexibility in, and
compensation for, the promissor's performance.34 Control of the draft may
thus result in a contract that is heavily slanted in the drafting party's favor,
ECON. REV. 356, 356-58 (1980) [hereinafter B. Klein] (noting that, because
contracts cannot address all contingencies, "wealth-maximizing transactors have
the ability and often the incentive to renege on the transaction by holding up the
other party ... The question then becomes how much the hold-up problem can be
avoided by an explicit government-enforced contract"); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain
Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary
Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43, 47 (2007-2008) (noting that
"[o]pportunism [between contracting parties] arises because parties lack foresight
about the future, and because bargaining over possible future contingencies and
adding language to contracts is expensive"); Kyle J. Mayer and Nicholas S.
Argyres, Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer Industry, 15
ORG. Sc. 394, 396 (2004) ("The capacity for contracts to adequately safeguard
relationship-specific investments against opportunistic behavior by a contractual
power is, however, limited. This is because foreseeing all the possible future
contingencies under which a contractual hazard can emerge is very difficult ... .
32 Eric A. Zacks, The Moral Hazard of Contract Drafting, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 24) [hereinafter E.A. Zacks, Moral Hazard],
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2399875 ("If one
party has been empowered to prepare the contract on behalf of the other party (that
will affect the contractual/legal relationship between the parties), then an economic
agency relationship with respect to contract preparation may exist."). This is
distinct from the economic agency relationship that may exist between the parties
following execution of the party, as discussed in Section II.B., supra. In that
instance, each promissor is the economic agent of the other with respect to such
promissor's contractual promises and the separate economic agency relationship
that will exist after the contract has been executed. Id. at 16.33 Id. at 4 ("In contract law, the drafting party (the economic agent) may prepare
contracts utilizing the same information and control asymmetries in order to
advantage itself relative to the non-drafting party (the principal).").34 Id. at 29 ("Thus, the agent has an interest in a written contract that provides the
most flexibility for the agent, less exposure to potential liability for the agent, less
flexibility for the other party, and a greater exposure to potential liability for the
other party.").
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again based on the differing interests, information, and control of the parties
with respect to preparation of the contract draft.35
In this instance, an attorney may be employed to both exploit and
avoid the moral hazard faced by the drafting party. First, an attorney may
be retained by the party responsible for drafting the contract in order to
prepare a heavily slanted contract in favor of such party.36 The attorney may
prepare a heavily slanted contract and also utilize formatting, presentation,
or language techniques designed to reduce the ability of the non-drafting
party to detect the unfavorable provisions.3 7 Once legalese, length, and
complexity have been added to the contract, the non-drafting party may be
unable to detect self-interested behavior on the part of the drafting party
(the economic agent) and the drafting party's attorney (the economic
agent's agent).38
Second, the non-drafting party may incur costs to detect or prevent
such self-interested behavior, which may include retaining outside
advisors. 39 Thus, the non-drafting party could hire an attorney to review the
initial draft of the contract. The attorney presumably would be in a better
position to advise as to whether the initial draft is appropriate. 40 This could
35 Id. at 32 ("As an economic agent, the drafting party now faces a moral hazard
[as all agents do]. The drafting party is incentivized to prepare the contract in such
a way as to maximize her interests.").36 Id. at 30:
Accordingly, if the drafting party is a repeat player (such as a
corporate entity that routinely does business with similarly situated
customers), the drafting party also would prefer to have a contract
that has a standard set of terms which are well understood by the
drafting party and provide consistent legal results, even if that
involves the engagement and expense of professionals. Id.
7 Id. at 33 ("Similarly, drafting parties can deter detection of their actions by
increasing the transaction costs for the non-drafting party involved with reviewing
and negotiating the agreement, including by using legalistic language, lengthy
agreements, or delayed delivery of contractual terms.").3 Id. at 34-35:
[M]any parties entering into a contract may be unaware of the legal
implications of particular language (even if the terms are
understandable). In certain instances, the contract party may also not
have the time (or not be inclined to spend the time) to read a lengthy
contract to determine and consider the legal implications of each
provision.
See also Naomi Miyake & Donald A. Norman, To Ask a Question, One Must Know
Enough to Know What is Not Known, 18 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL
BEHAVIOR 357, 362 (1979) ("The most interesting result is that novices do not ask
many questions on material that is too difficult.... People do not appear to be able
to cope with material too far beyond their present knowledge.").
39 Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 1219 ("Often, even if people employ a suboptimal
strategy and cannot adapt, they can recognize their own limitations and hire others
to help them make decisions.").40 Id. at 1216 ("As an alternative to organizational choice, people can delegate their
decisions to others. Many professionals offer more than just knowledge-they offer
a better decisionmaking perspective.").
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include advising as to whether the written contract accurately describes and
conditions the promised transactions (the "business deal"). The attorney
could also advise as to terms included in the written contract that were not
negotiated by the parties ahead of time.
An attorney also can help the principal to address problematic
drafting by the drafting party (the agent).41 For example, the attorney may
be able to secure better transaction or contract terms.4 2 The attorney also
could revise the contract in her client's favor.43 The use of an attorney also
may serve to reduce problematic decision-making processes employed by
the principal, such as those associated with particular cognitive biases.44
Employing an attorney, particularly an experienced or well-known attorney,
also might be expected to deter the drafting party (or the drafting party's
attorney) from acting opportunistically and drafting a one-sided contract in
the first place.
Thus, the employment of attorneys by clients entering into a
contract can be understood as an agency cost incurred with respect to the
principal-agent relationship that exists with respect to the preparation of the
written contract.45  These costs are designed to address the information
asymmetries that otherwise would exist between the two parties with
respect to the contents of the contract.46
The view of employing attorneys preparing or reviewing contracts
as an agency cost is not necessarily inconsistent with the transaction cost
engineer explanation. Under each theory, the attorney is engaged to make it
more likely that the transaction (executing the contract) occurs. Whether as
a transaction cost engineer or monitor of self-interested behavior, attorneys
tasked with contract review are typically faced with many of the same
41 E.A. Zacks, Moral Hazard, supra note 32 (manuscript at 51).
42 Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 1216-17 ("Attorneys, situated somewhat outside of
the decisionmaking environment, can see multiple frames and other perspectives
more easily than clients.").43 E.A. Zacks, Moral Hazard, supra note 32 (manuscript at 52).
44 See discussion infra Section III.45 E.A. Zacks, Moral Hazard, supra note 32 (manuscript at 52) ("Where
sophisticated principals have incurred (or are able to incur) agency costs and
attempted (or are able to) monitor the preparation of the contract, the agents'
behavior in light of the moral hazard may be constrained.").
46 Id. at 52-53. ("[W]here these agency costs are not or cannot be incurred
regularly, there perhaps is more concern that the agent will be able to utilize her
superior information and control to prepare a one-sided contract."). The ability to
employ attorneys may suggest that the client is able to protect herself with respect
to such information asymmetries or boundedly rational behavior. Accordingly,
situations in which attorneys have been utilized often suggest that the principal
parties are "sophisticated," and courts consequently are reluctant to disregard the
significance of assent given to contracts negotiated in such circumstances. Id. at 58
("However imperfect, the use of the 'sophistication' label allows courts to
determine whether the principal (the non-drafting party) should or could have been
able to detect any opportunistic behavior by the agent (the drafting party).").
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issues and may entail similar or complementary tasks. Instead of two
principals interacting (with or without attorneys) to establish the "business"
terms, the reviewing attorney is entrusted to ensure that the document
mirrors shared expectations regarding performance and possible
contingencies.47 For example, anattorney typically is interested in ensuring
that the contract reflects the terms of the transaction as explained by the
principals, addresses likely contingencies, and constrains opportunistic
behavior by the other business party after the contract has been executed. 48
In each instance, however, these tasks are to be performed by
human beings subject to cognitive biases, situational pressures, and moral
hazards. The next Section discusses how these factors affect the reviewing
attorney and provide the drafting attorney with an opportunity to draft
strategically to exploit such factors.
III. COGNITION AND CONTRACT REVIEW
This Section focuses on contract preparation in contemplation that
an attorney will be on the other side reviewing one's draft. Accordingly,
this Section examines some of the decision-making biases and processes of
the attorney responding to an initial contract draft. The section also
examines the implications of these issues for contract preparation by the
drafting party.
A. Anchoring
Anchoring may be an important part of contract preparation.
Anchoring is an effect that "occurs when people consider a particular value
for an unknown quantity before estimating that quantity. ',49 In other words,
people are affected by the presence of a value, random or not, when
determining what the proper value is or should be and adjust their
calculations accordingly.5 ° If one is exposed to high numbers (even
47 JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 44 (1975) ("The great bulk of every
acquisition agreement is designed to answer in advance certain questions that might
otherwise be the subject of differing interpretations, disputes, and ultimately
litigation."). Accordingly, Freund argues that "[o]ne of the lawyer's key roles in an
acquisition is to translate into legally cognizable concepts the often fragmentary
and oversimplified notions of the parties as to the terms of the deal between them,
and then to articulate those concepts through meaningful contractual words and
phrases." Id. at 44-45.See discussion supra Section lI.B.
49 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 119 (2011).50 Id. at 119-20 (finding this true even if stated value has nothing to do with initial
value); Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment &
Litigation, 59 VAND. L. REv. 2017, 2026 (2006) ("People generally adjust away
from the initial anchor, but their adjustment is often insufficient, giving the initial
anchor greater influence on the final estimate than is appropriate."); Marcel Kahan
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unrelated to the question), then one's answer to a question will be higher
than it would be in the absence of such exposure.51 This has consequences
in the commercial setting. For example, it has been demonstrated that
52setting the initial price in a buy-sell transaction is an advantage.
Accordingly, the initial draft of the written contract, including the
one-sidedness or content of its terms, may have an anchoring effect.5 3 This
effect goes beyond the baseline that is necessarily created because the
initial draft exists. To be clear, the presentation (and existence) of the
written contract is necessarily a baseline from which all deviations will be
& Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing
Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 362 (1996)
("Once initial reference points, or 'anchors,' are established, adjustments to these
initial anchors tend to be too small. Anchoring thus biases final judgments in the
direction of the anchor.").
51 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49 ("What happens is one of the most reliable and robust
results of experimental psychology: the estimates stay close to the number that
people considered-hence the image of an anchor."); Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra
note 50, at 2027 ("Regardless of the underlying explanation, anchoring is a
2owerfil phenomenon.").
KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 120 ("[T]he same house will appear more
valuable if its listing price is high than if it is low, even if you are determined to
resist the influence of this number...."); Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 50, at
2027-2028 (describing effect of revealing jurisdictional limits on damages on
mock jury awards); Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts,
Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property
Pricing Decisions, 39 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 84,94 (1987)
(finding anchoring to be powerful even "in an information-rich setting where
subjects had ample opportunity for interaction with information sources"); Dan Orr
& Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New Insightsfrom Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597, 609 (2006) ("[A]nchoring
at the bargaining table may lead to much more inefficiency and inequity than
anchoring in the courtroom.").
53 SCOTT PLOus, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING 151
(1993) ("People adjust insufficiently from anchor values, regardless of whether thejudgment concerns the chances of nuclear war, the value of a house, or any number
of other topics."); id. at 152 (suggesting that "it may be worth considering multiple
anchors before attempting to make a final estimate" or decision); Orr & Guthrie,
supra note 52, at 611 ( "[S]tudies suggest that anchoring can affect negotiation.
Opening offers, policy limits, damage caps, and other starting figures appear to
influence outcomes at the bargaining table."); id. at 624 ("Negotiators who are
aware of anchoring can-and should-use this information to their advantage in at
least two ways. First ... by setting high goals to themselves prior to the negotiation.
Second ... by opening with high demands (or low offers) when they are at the
bargaining table."); John Richardson, How Negotiators Choose Standards of
Fairness: A Look at the Empirical Evidence and Some Steps Toward A Process
Model, 12 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 415, 426 (2007) ("[O]nce we adopt an idea or a
number, we look for reasons to adjust it. While we may move in the direction
suggested by our subsequent analysis, we tend to move less than we should ...
Second, once we hear an idea we tend to look for supporting or confirming
information, and ignore disconfirming information.").
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made.54 Unless the opposing attorney completely rewrites the draft, all
changes will be made from the starting point of the initial draft. Although
difficult and perhaps costly, this could occur, and no advantage will have
been realized from preparing the initial draft with one-sided terms.
The anchoring effect, however, suggests that changes to the
baseline (the initial draft) proposed by the opposing attorney will be
affected by the existence of the initial draft. Thus, even if the opposing
attorney is determined to rewrite the contract completely and resist the
positions outlined in the initial draft, cognitive science findings suggest that
the existence of initial values or terms in the contract will influence the
opposing attorney's revisions, even those made on a wholesale basis.5 5 For
example, one could imagine two contract drafts prepared by the buyer, one
that proposes a three-year period within which to bring lawsuits against the
seller and one that proposes a seven-year period. The anchor of seven years
as opposed to three years may be expected to influence the opposing
attorney's advice to her client and subsequent revision.56 Based on
cognitive science findings, one would expect the opposing attorney to
respond with a term that is closer to seven years as opposed to three years,
even though there is no rational reason for such to be the case and even if
the opposing attorney's preliminary position with respect to contractual
limitations is the same in each situation.57
14 It has been recognized, for example, that there are advantages in being the drafter
aside from considerations such as anchoring. See FREUND, supra note 47, at 26-27
("The fact is that there are so many elective opportunities in drafting a contract-
choices in the introducing and phrasing of concepts, the omission of certain
language, the deliberate use of ambiguity, and so on-that a fair number of your
resultant edges are bound to slip by the critical gaze of even the most astute
adversary counsel").
55 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 304 ( "Many of the messages that negotiators
exchange in the course of bargaining are attempts to communicate a reference point
and provide an anchor to the other side."); Richardson, supra note 53, at 427 ("A
number of studies have shown that negotiators are affected by anchoring as much
as individual decision-makers are."); Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Heuristic
Strategies for Estimation Under Uncertainty: The Enigmatic Case ofAnchoring, in
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION: A FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF ROBERT S.
WYER, JR. 79, 80 (Galen V. Bodenhausen & Alan J. Lambert eds., 2003) (noting
that "the number that starts the generation of a judgment exerts a stronger impact
than do subsequent pieces of numeric information").
56 Orr & Guthrie, supra note 52, at 625:
[I]t is worth observing that research on anchoring suggests that
negotiators can benefit from starting with even more self-serving
positions, even positions that they cannot possibly justify. This seems
particularly true when the opposing negotiator is relatively
inexperienced in the kind of negotiation at hand and when the offeror
expects the recipient of the offer to possess relatively little
information about the value of the item being negotiated. Id.
5 This is based purely on the anchoring effect upon the opposing attorney and does
not consider what the result of client interaction or input might be. If the opposing
party is adamantly against a term beyond one year, then it may not matter whether
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An even more extreme example is the difference between asking
for nothing and asking for something. For example, the drafting attorney
may believe that it will be unlikely for the non-drafting attorney to accept a
limitation on damages provision in favor of the drafting attorney's client. In
such an instance, one option for the drafting attorney is not to include any
limitation on damages provision, since that is where the drafting attorney
believes that the parties will end up. The anchoring effect, however,
suggests that simply asking for the limitation on damages provision by
including it in the initial draft makes it more likely that some sort of
limitation on damages provision will be included, even if not in the desired
form.58 This may seem obvious (i.e., it is obvious that if the provision
favoring one party is not included in the first draft, it is unlikely that the
second party will insert it), but it must be recalled that in each instance, the
non-drafting party and the non-drafting party's attorney are assumed to
have the same position or attitude with respect to the limitation on damages
provision.5 9 There is no rational reason, therefore, for the non-drafting
attorney to accept the limitation on damages provision in any form.
Nevertheless, if a provision of a particular type is included, the anchoring
effect suggests that it is more likely that such a provision, even in a weaker
form, will ultimately end up in the final agreement.
One could also imagine "bundling" the anchor effect by drafting an
agreement that has many one-sided provisions as opposed to just a few. By
dropping the anchor in deeper water, it may be more likely that the non-
drafting attorney will concede on more points or not achieve the position
desired ex ante. For example, imagine three different contracts: (i) a
contract that specifies a three-year period within which to sue for damages
and a narrow definition of what constitutes recoverable damages, (ii) a
the initial draft proposes a three-year term or seven-year term. On the other hand,
the anchoring effect could also be suffered by the opposing party, meaning that
including a higher term (the seven year term) would also influence the opposing
party when instructing her attorney how to respond to the initial draft. One could
also argue that such a response is rational. For example, one could argue that the
client for whom the buyer's attorney is preparing the draft cares more about the
period of time to bring claims (since a longer term was proposed), which would
suggest that the seller's attorney is merely responding rationally to the signal from
the buyer that the period of time is important by agreeing to a higher term. This
does not, however, necessarily have to be true (or, even if true, otherwise negate
the effect or its importance). One could imagine two buyers who would each like at
least a three-year term, in which instance one would imagine that the draft
containing the seven-year term has a better chance of ending up with a provision
that is satisfactory.
58 Orr & Guthrie, supra note 52, at 597 (noting that, as a result of anchoring, "we
are often unduly influenced by the initial figure we encounter when estimating the
value of an item").
59 Other mitigating factors, such as the desire to appear cooperative or willing to
trade one unfavorable provision for another, are similarly ignored for purposes of
this example.
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contract that specifies a seven-year period within which to sue for damages
and a narrow definition of what constitutes recoverable damages, and (iii) a
contract that specifies a seven-year period within which to sue for damages
and a broad definition of what constitutes recoverable damages. Perhaps the
two provisions act as one anchor, which would suggest that the contract
described in (iii) would yield the best result for the buyer's attorney drafting
the contract (again, assuming that the seller's attorney has the same ex ante
position with respect to these issues before receiving the draft).60
In other contexts, where it has not been established which party will
prepare the first draft, we should expect a significant battle. This would
reflect parties' implicit understanding that the first stake in the ground will
be hard to move too far, or at least as far as it would be if the other party
were permitted to hammer in the first stake.6 1
B. Status Quo Bias
Related to the anchoring effect is the status quo bias. The status quo
bias describes the tendency of individuals to prefer the status quo even if
the status quo does not efficiently allocate rights.62 In other words,
individuals may resist proposing change even if the initial position or
60 Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55
EMORY L.J. 423, 439 (2006):
A diversified firm may be able to exploit this decisional quirk by
offering a package price on a series of differentiated goods with
varying degrees of salience to consumers ... A high- or low-value
perception with respect to the first item in the package may anchor
the consumer's perception with respect to the remaining items in the
bundle, inducing a different valuation for the overall package than if
the customer had considered the varying items in the bundle
6i separately. Id.
1 Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil
Settlements, 4 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 40-41 (1999) (describing the effect of the
anchoring bias and reciprocity norms and its effect on negotiating tactics). Of
course, to the extent there is a power disparity between the principals, control of the
initial document likely is in and of itself a significant advantage to the drafting
party. See also Danielle K. Hart, Contract Law Now-Reality Meets Legal Fictions,
41 BALT. L. REv. 1, 20 (2011):
Because contracts are made binding ... the party that gets to dictate
or impose terms during contract formation will usually get to keep
and use those terms in the event of any subsequent contract dispute.
Clearly, the party that has the ability to impose terms during contract
62 formation is the party with the bargaining power to do so.Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL
L. REv. 608, 625 (1998) (describing how, as a result of the status quo bias, "people
systematically favor maintaining a state of affairs that they perceive as being the
status quo rather than switching to an alternative state, all else being equal");
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 50, at 359 (noting the "psychological preference for
the present state and corresponding bias [the endowment effect] against either
'buying' an object that the person does not 'own' or 'selling' an object that a
person does 'own"').
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course is not desirable. In the contracts context, parties may accept the
inclusion of contractual terms that do not necessarily reflect what the
parties would have agreed to had they negotiated them exhaustively. 63 For
example, contracts may induce deference on the part of the other party
simply by being presented in a particular manner.64
Consequently, the status quo bias suffered by the non-drafting
attorney may result in her proposing fewer changes to the initial draft of the
contract. 65 This is true even though the non-drafting attorney has been
tasked with a review of the entire contract and the non-drafting attorney
would not have included those terms (or drafted them as the drafting
attorney did) if the non-drafting attorney had prepared the initial draft.6 6
One could also imagine a cumulative effect with the status quo
bias. The longer the initial draft of the contract, the more chances the
drafting attorney has for the status quo bias suffered by the non-drafting
attorney to have an effect, particularly if the non-drafting attorney is trying
to minimize disruptions to the transaction.6 7 Similarly, the anchoring effect
(enabled by the drafting attorney staking out a more extreme position than
actually desired) may compound the status quo bias of the non-drafting
63 Robert L. Scharff & Francesco Parisi, The Role of Status Quo Bias and Bayesian
Learning in the Creation of New Legal Rights, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 25, 26 (2006)
("Status quo bias exists when decision makers choose to remain with the status quo
more often than traditional economic theory would suggest.") (citation omitted);
Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583,
15 84 (1998) [hereinafter Korobkin, Inertia] ("[T]he 'endowment effect,'...
suggests that the initial allocation of legal entitlements can affect preferences for
those entitlements. The consequence is that completely alienable legal entitlements
will.. .t[e]nd not to be traded--even when such stickiness cannot be explained by
transaction costs.").
64 Kahan & Klausner, supra note 50, at 362 (conjecturing that "the terms of a new
corporate contract will more closely resemble the standard terms than if the newly
formed contract were drafted on a clean, 'neutral' slate. This effect would be
present even when the transaction costs of writing a new contract are minimal");
Korobkin, Inertia, supra note 63, at 1607 (noting the persistence of the status quo
bias in contract negotiations regardless of "[w]hether the term associated with
inaction was derived from a legal default rule or an industry form contract").
65 Korobkin, Inertia, supra note 63, at 1627 ("The inertia theory suggests that ... it
might be possible for a party to convince an opposing negotiator that her uniquely
preferred set of contract terms will be enacted through 'inaction' rather than action,
even if those terms are uncommon in the industry in question and contrary to legal
defaults.").66 Id. (hypothesizing that "contracting parties can gain a powerful advantage in
negotiations by providing a set of draft terms as the basis for detailed negotiations
with their contracting partners").
67 Id. at 1592 ("Terms that will govern a contract only if the parties take affirmative
steps to establish the term can be more expensive to implement than are terms that
operate as a result of inaction. All other things equal, parties should rationally
prefer contract terms that require less time and effort to negotiate and draft than
alternatives.").
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party, resulting in a contract that not only includes undesirable types of
provisions (from the non-drafting party's client's point of view), but one.
that includes particularly undesirable formulations of those provisions
(again, from the same point of view).6 8
C. Regret Theory and Optimism Bias
Regret theory is based on an individual's preference to end up in a
worse situation through inaction rather than through action. 69  Thus,
individuals' behavior often is influenced by the desire to avoid regret,
which can lead to an individual maintaining current behavior or avoiding
any act that could lead to regret.7 ° Individuals typically feel more regret
from a loss arising from engaging in a new activity than from a loss arising
from being passive.7'
An example of how this may be implicated in the contract
preparation scenario follows. When the initial draft of the contract is
presented to the non-drafting attorney, there are few different outcomes.
The non-drafting attorney has to weigh the risks and rewards of an
68 Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in "Legalese ", 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
59, 74 (2001) (describing three "psychological dynamics" that provide precedent
forms of contracts with "an edge over innovation ... a status quo bias, an
'anchoring effect,' and a conformity bias").69 Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and
the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211, 1224 (2003)
(describing "the tendency to care much more about errors of commission than
about errors of omission, even when there is no obvious normative reason to draw a
distinction").
70 Philip E. Tetlock, An Alternative Metaphor in the Study of Judgment and Choice:
People as Politicians, 1 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 451, 472 (1991) (describing how
"people tend to avoid decisions in which they could appear after the fact to have
made the wrong choice, even if in advance the decision appeared correct given the
information available at the time"); see also Zacks, Blame, supra note 6 at 176 (the
"status quo bias describes the tendency of individuals to prefer the status quo (the
contract as presented) even if the status quo does not efficiently allocate rights").7 Tetlock, supra note 69, at 472 ("[p]eople feel greater regret for bad outcomes
that are the result of new actions than for similar outcomes resulting from
inaction."); Korobkin, Inertia, supra note 62, at 1613 ("Substantial experimental
evidence suggests that individuals predict greater regret will follow an action that
leads to an undesirable result than a failure to act that leads to the same undesirable
act."); see also Marcel Zeelenberg, The Use of Crying Over Spilled Milk: A Note on
the Rationality and Functionality of Regret, 12 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 325, 329 (1999)
(explaining how "we may avoid deciding as a consequence of anticipated
regret... simply in order to avoid making the wrong decision"); Eric A. Zacks,
Unstacking the Deck? Contract Manipulation and Credit Card Accountability, 78
U. CiN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (2010) (arguing that "[t]he tendency to experience
more regret from negative situations resulting from actions an individual takes
rather than inaction also may explain [credit card holders'] reluctance to negotiate
credit card agreements"); Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret
Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 72 (1999)
(positing "that litigants seek to make litigation decisions that minimize the
likelihood they will experience postdecision regret").
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aggressive mark-up as opposed to a passive mark-up. The non-drafting
attorney could be very aggressive in her mark-up in the draft on behalf of
her client. This aggression could be designed to address (detect and
constrain) the opportunistic behavior of the opposing party following
execution of the contract.72 The risk to such aggression is the drafting party
suggesting to the non-drafting attorney's client that the non-drafting
attorney is "killing the deal. 7 3 If the revisions are too aggressive, the non-
drafting attorney could be signaling that the non-drafting party's client is
not easy to work with or is expecting trouble following execution of the
contract. 74  If such revisions are not made (because the non-drafting
attorney is more passive), however, then the client could be left unprotected
in the event that the other party does act opportunistically or issuesarise
otherwise.
Regret theory suggests that the non-drafting attorney would prefer
to be more passive than aggressive, even if being more passive is equally
risky (the risk of the client suffering harm in the future) as being more
aggressive (the risk of losing, ending up with a bad outcome, or delaying
the deal and upsetting the client).75 This may be particularly true for
transactional attorneys, who often pride themselves on being "deal-makers"
and not "deal-breakers. 76 Transactional attorneys who vigorously contest
every issue may be disfavored, as they may increase the risk of the
72 See supra Section II.B.
73 Korobkin, Inertia, supra note 62, at 1615:
The regret that arises from the occurrence of undesirable events can
be understood as a response to what is known as "counterfactual
thinking." ... [I]ndividuals are likely to perceive failures to act as
relatively normal, or typical, and difficult to avoid, while they are
likely to perceive actions as relatively atypical, usually avoidable,
and subject to more second-guessing. Id.
75 See infra Sections V.B and V.C.
7 Korobkin, Inertia, supra note 62, at 1586 ( "I contend that a bias in favor of
inaction minimizes possible future regret that a negotiator might experience if
agreed upon contractual terms turn out, in hindsight, to be undesirable."). This
assumes, of course, that the outcomes are equally negative. This is not necessarily
true, but it still suggests that there will be some inclination by the attorney to prefer
a less disruptive course.
76 George W. Dent, Jr., The Role of Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 953, 953 (2003) [hereinafter Dent, Strategic Alliances] ("Business
people often feel that lawyers are deal breakers, not dealmakers."); Gilson, supra
note 1, at 242 (calling lawyers "deal killers"); Andrew J. Sherman, Esq., The
Business Lawyer's Expanding Role in Facilitating Small and Mid-Sized Merger
and Acquisition Transactions, BUS. L. BRIEF (AM. U.), Spring 2005, at 13 ("[T]he
role of all lawyers to the transaction ... is to work hard to keep the deal on track."),
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/blr/01/2sherman.pdf, John M. Tyson,
Drafting, Interpreting, and Enforcing Commercial and Shopping Leases, 14
CAMPBELL L. REV. 275, 276 (1992) ("The attorney's role in commercial real estate
transactions requires a greater use of the counselor portion of the license to practice
law. In negotiating, the successful attorney will learn how to be a deal maker, not a
deal breaker.").
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transaction not occurring.77 Accordingly, transactional attorneys may be
especially prone to "letting issues go" in the draft in the interest of
consummating the transaction. 8 The risk to one's reputation and
relationship with the client that arises from being "active" when revising
the contract draft will be more impactful on attorney behavior than the risk
to the client that arises from being "passive."
Moreover, the non-drafting attorney may improperly discount the
risk of future opportunistic behavior of the opposing party or other
problematic contingencies (that may not be prevented because of a passive
mark-up of the contract). The optimism bias refers to an individual's
tendency to underestimate the risks involved with a particular activity in
which the individual is engaged.79 Although attorneys and other outside
advisors may be somewhat less susceptible to the cognitive biases suffered
by their clients, it may be a different scenario when the attorneys are
assessing risks that relate to the attorneys as well as their clients. 80 In this
instance, the non-drafting attorney may be measuring the risk of a possible
future negative outcome for the client (arising from a passive mark-up)
against the risk that the client will be unhappy in the present (because the
attorney was too aggressive in revising the draft). In such an instance, the
attorney may be susceptible to the optimism bias and inaccurately assess
77 Dent, Strategic Alliances, supra note 76, at 956-57 (noting that in many
situations, "the ... hard bargaining lawyer is not what the client is looking for....
The goal is to obtain the mutual satisfaction of the parties").
78 Id. at 958 ("[P]roposing detailed terms may provoke suspicion that you're not
going to try to work problems out cooperatively, but you're going to stand on your
contractual rights."); Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate
Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 545 (1994) (suggesting that
lawyers also may lose objectivity to the extent that they become invested (with
time and prestige) in a transaction).79 Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in Negotiation,
20 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 683, 725-28 (2005) (describing the prevalence of
the optimism bias); Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard
Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 147 (2007) ("People are unrealistically
optimistic with respect to many important aspects of their lives."); Christine Jolls &
Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 204 (2006)
("Optimism bias refers to the tendency of people to believe that their own
probability of facing a bad outcome is lower than it actually is."); Robert Prentice,
Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 362-63 (2003); Rachlinski, supra note 5, at 1219
("Psychological research on self-serving biases supports the intuition that it is
awfully easy for people to believe things that are in their self-interest to believe.").
80 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 657-58 (1999) ("[I]t
seems that the optimistic bias is an indiscriminate and indefatigable cognitive
feature, causing individuals to underestimate the extent to which a threat applies to
them even when they can recognize the severity it poses to others."); Rachlinski,
supra note 5, at 1216 (describing how financial planners help alleviate
overconfidence problems when clients select their own investments); id.
("Attorneys also can restructure problems for their clients in ways that avoid
common cognitive pitfalls.").
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the actual risk of the negative outcome arising as a result of the former
course. Compounded with regret theory, the optimism bias and other self-
serving biases may act to deter aggressive revisions to a contract draft,
suggesting that drafting attorneys (again) may have an opportunity to
provide an advantage to their clients by drafting aggressively.
81
D. Complexity and Positive/Negative Information
Cognitive science findings also suggest that human beings have a
limited ability to synthesize all information available.82 For example, it has
been demonstrated that individuals will utilize "shortcuts" when faced with
a lot of information or complexity in a decision. 3
Accordingly, a drafting attorney can introduce complexity into a
contract with the intention of overwhelming the non-drafting attorney or at
least making the cognitive task of reviewing the contract more difficult.84
One way in which to make the contract more complex is through the use
81 Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 50, at 2044 ("Due to self-serving biases,
litigants, their lawyers, and other stakeholders might overestimate their own
abilities, the quality of their advocacy, and the relative merits of the positions they
are advocating.").
82 Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection " Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L.
REv. 1, 48 (1999) [hereinafter Korobkin, Efficiency] (describing Herbert Simon's
belief "that limitations on individuals' cognitive ability to process large and
complicated data sets bound their capacity to make so-called 'rational' decisions,
such that boundedly rational behavior is an unavoidable aspect of the human
condition"); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN.
L. REv. 1153, 1163 (2002) ("It is now well-known that people are not in fact
perfectly rational.... Because of the limitations in their ability to process
information, boundedly rational agents are not able to maintain a system of beliefs,
preferences, and dispositions that is both comprehensive and intemally coherent.");
Kojo Yelpaala, Legal Consciousness and Contractual Obligations, 39 MCGEORGE
L. REv. 193, 215 (2008) ("[B]ecause of limitations in human cognitive capacities
and analytical abilities, human decisions often fail to satisfy the utility
maximization prediction suggested by the rational choice theory.").
83 Korobkin, Efficiency, supra note 81, at 52 ("When choices become more
complex ... decision makers often place relatively more emphasis on the goal of
reducing cognitive effort and relatively less emphasis on the goal of achieving
accuracy, thus becoming more likely to employ selective or noncompensatory
decision-making strategies."); Yelpalaa, supra note 81, at 216-17 ("It is argued that
heuristic biases, or rules of thumb, appear to be techniques for avoiding the
complex task of decision-making either because it is the least costly and/or because
of inertia.").
84 This has been suggested in other contexts, most notably the consumer contracts.
See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 53:
Complexity plays into the imperfect rationality of [credit]
cardholders.... Increased complexity may be attractive to issuers, as
it allows them to hide the true cost of the credit card in a
multidimensional pricing maze .... When the number of price
dimensions goes up, the number of non-salient price dimensions can
also be expected to go up.
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and placement of defined terms. Defined terms in a contract are used as
shorthand to refer to longer or more complex terms that are used more than
once. For example, instead of referencing the formal name of all of the
parties to the contract each time the contract requires such a reference, the
contract may define "Parties" (as used in the contract) to refer to all of the
parties.8 6 These defined terms simplify the contract by not requiring the
drafter to redefine a concept every time the concept is used. 7 This often is
useful when the defined term refers to a calculation or component utilized
in the calculation. In many acquisition agreements, there is a purchase price
adjustment based on a complicated formula, which may take into account
such factors as the amount of bank account cash deposits and indebtedness
for borrowed funds of the target company at the closing.8 8 Accordingly, the
agreement could define the "Purchase Price Adjustment" (so that the entire
calculation for doing the adjustment does not need to be listed each time the
adjustment is mentioned) based on the formula for adjusting the "Cash" and
"Debt" (so that the lengthier and more specific definitions of "Cash" and
"Liabilities" do not need to be listed each time the terms are used).89
Although intended to simplify the contract, these defined terms can
also add complexity if used strategically. For example, the drafting attorney
could include the definition of each capitalized term in a nonsensical place
85 See, e.g., Gisela M. Munoz, Writing Tips for the Transactional Attorney, PRAC.
REAL EST. LAW., May 2005, at 35-36 ("[T]he recitals provide you with an
opportunity to define certain terms that will be used repeatedly throughout the
contract."); Joshua Stein, How to Use Defined Terms to Make Transactional
Documents Work Better, PRAC. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 16:
When the same concept arises more than once, the drafter should
express it the same way each time.... As soon as you refer in a
document to any concept that takes more than three or four words to
explain, and then refer to the same concept a second time, that is the
moment to consider setting up a defined term. Id.
86 Munoz, supra note 84, at 36 (describing how the introductory paragraph in an
agreement can define particular terms so that the shorthand, such as "Tenant" or
"Landlord," can be used throughout the agreement); Stein, supra note 84, at 17
(describing party names as being external defined terms that "are unique to the
external circumstances of this particular transaction").
87 Stein, supra note 84, at 16 ("Instead of using the same long string of words a
third time (and making sure you use exactly the same long string of words), you
simply throw in a quick defined term.").8 8 See, e.g., COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, MODEL ASSET PURCHASE
AGREEMENT § 2.8 (American Bar Association, 2001) (describing and including
sample provisions for various purchase price adjustments); R. Bradford Malt, Form
of Purchase Price Adjustment Provision, in MODEL AGREEMENTS FOR CORP
COUNSEL § 66.10 (2011), available at
http://lawschool.westlaw.com/shared/westlawRedirect.aspx?task=find&cite=8+Mo
del+Agrmts+for+Corp+Couns+%c2%a7+66%3a10&appflag=67.12 (setting forth a
Purchase price adjustment).
Stein, supra note 84, at 18 ("Creating defined terms ... helps assure that any
'laundry list' will make only a single appearance in the document, in defining a
term to use later as a surrogate for the list.... The reader is no longer forced to read,
again and again, the same long lists of similar words.").
404 THE OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 9.2
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
(e.g., in a place where the term is not used) or utilize more defined terms
than is necessary (so that the reviewing attorney has to look up the
definition of many more terms than otherwise would be necessary).90 This
could be enhanced by omitting a separate definitions section that includes
internal cross-references for where capitalized terms are not defined (if not
otherwise defined in the definitions section) or by the placement of the
definition section at the end of an agreement or in a separate ancillary
document (e.g., when the non-drafting attorney is not a sophisticated or
experienced transactional attorney), which would, in each instance, require
a reviewing attorney to flip between pages of the agreement when
attempting to determine the meaning of operative provisions (such as a
section concerning purchase price adjustments). 9 1
Complexity also could be introduced through the use of legalese,
contract length (both overall and with respect to each provision or
sentence), and the inclusion of many transaction agreements (particularly
where cross-references to multiple agreements are contained within each
transaction agreement).92 In each instance, the drafting attorney could
intend to make the reviewing attorney's cognitive process when reviewing
the draft more difficult, and induce deference or other cognitive "shortcuts"
when reviewing the agreement. As the task becomes more difficult, the
more unlikely it is that the reviewing attorney will be able to resist all of the
provisions as drafted.9 3
90 Sheida White, Mining the Text: 34 Text Features That Can Ease or Obstruct
Text Comprehension and Use, 51 LITERACY RES. & INSTRUCTION 143, 152 (2012)
("Information that provides a key to a pictorial representation or supplements
information that is presented semantically in the text; such information increases
difficulty [in comprehension of the text] by requiring respondents to refer to a
spatially separated piece of information.").
9 It is customary to include such a definitions section in a lengthy purchase
agreement. COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, supra note 87, at § 1.1 cmts.
("It is useful, both to reduce the length of other sections and to facilitate changes
during negotiations, to list in a section of the acquisition agreement all defined
terms that appear in more than one section of the agreement.").
92 White, supra note 89, at 149-50 (describing features, such as syntactic
embedding and propositional density, that makes comprehending texts more
difficult). White also describes features that "make texts more difficult to
understand and use-regardless of the task to be completed-by affecting the way
texts are written (the linguistic context) and structured (the nonlinguistic context),"
including the number of total words in a document, levels of embedding, cross-
references, and sentence length and vocabulary. Id. at 150-53.93 Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the
Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 CAL. L. REv. 51,
78 (2013) ("When drafters want to discourage reading, they can increase the costs
of doing so by increasing the length and opacity of their standard forms."); Jeff
Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated
Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1635, 1660-61 (2006) (criticizing the
inflation of transaction costs by sellers, such as by increasing contract complexity,
to deter buyer detection of unfavorable terms).
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The drafting attorney may also consider the power of silence in a
contract.94 In an extreme example, an individual may find it difficult to
determine what is missing.95 Therefore, a drafting attorney may find it
advantageous to omit a type of term than to draft a one-sided provision (to
the extent possible). For example, rather than proposing a high limitation on
damages recoverable from the drafting attorney's client, it may be more
advantageous to exclude any limitation on damages or similar provisions in
the initial draft if the drafting attorney believes that the reviewing attorney
will be unable to detect the absence of such provisions.96 By not calling
attention to the type of provision that might exist, a drafting attorney may
achieve a better result by omitting the category provision altogether. This
may be particularly true for complex contracts and for non-drafting
attorneys that are not sufficiently familiar with a particular type of
transaction. 97 The non-drafting attorney may be unable to detect the missing
94 See generally, Ying-Ju Chen & Xiaojian Zhao, Solution Concepts of Principal-
Agent Models with Unawareness ofActions, 4 GAMES 508, 509 (2013) ("The novel
feature that arises from the agent's unawareness is that there is room for the
principal to determine what to announce/include in the contract...."); Ronald Fagin
& Joseph Y. Halpem, Belief Awareness, and Limited Reasoning, 34 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 39, 40 (1988) (critiquing particular models for knowledge and belief
because of assumptions about "logical omniscience"). As Fagin and Halpern note,
"in real life people are certainly not omniscient," in part often because of a lack of
awareness (if one is not aware of a particular concept in the first place) or not
focusing on all issues simultaneously. Id. at 40-41; accord Emel Filiz-Ozbay,
Incorporating Unawareness into Contract Theory, 76 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV.
181, 185-90 (2012) (describing how insurers can strategically use the unawareness
of buyers in insurance contracts by either increasing or not addressing such
unawareness); David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., The Role of Prior Knowledge and
Missing Information in Multiattribute Valuation, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 76, 77 (1992) ("[D]ifficulty is often encountered in the
processing of nonoccurrences or nonevents. People do not readily detect and
identify the absence of important features.").
95 Filiz-Ozbay, supra note 93, at 181 ("When the insuree reads a contract offered
by the insurer, she may become aware of some new aspects of the uncertainty and
start taking them into account."); accord Chen & Zhao, supra note 93, at 509
("[S]ince the contract follower (hereafter the agent) is not [under their model] fully
aware of all aspects relevant to the contractual relationship, the contractual
proposer (hereafter the principal) may strategically disclose only a subset of
relevant aspects in the contract at his own benefit.") Consequently, the contract
drafter may have additional discretion or flexibility ex post if the agent was not
aware of the issue as addressed (or not addressed) in the contract. Id. at 514.
96 Chen & Zhao, supra note 93, at 509 (noting that the "contract offer may serve as
an eye-opener that broadens the agent's [the contract reviewer] vision and allows
the agent to get a better understanding of the entire picture").97 Id. ("While confronted with these unawareness issues and the potential
exploitation by others, the strategic decisions of contracting parties critically
depend on their sophistication."). Accordingly, "[t]he higher cognitive effort the
agent spends ex ante, the more likely she is able to identify a contractual trap given
that there is indeed a trap. Thus, the principal must take into account the agent's
cognitive effort and the possible consequences upon designing the contract." Id. at
510.
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limitation, and the drafting attorney's client is thereby advantaged.98
Accordingly, omitting terms may be a powerful one-sided "provision" in an
initial draft of a contract.
E. Reciprocity, Contrast, and Loss Aversion
An important influence upon human decisions is the "rule for
reciprocation," which is the tendency of individuals to feel obligated to pay
someone in the future for something that she has done for us. 99 The
compulsion to repay someone is a powerful force that often can be used to
induce others to agree to otherwise undesired requests. 0 0 For example,
studies show that providing someone with a gift, however valueless or
undesired, will influence their decision to accede to a later request, like
agreeing to make a charitable donation upon solicitation. 01 In the written
contract context, the drafting attorney does not provide a "gift" to the
opposing attorney, so it may appear that the influence of reciprocity is not
important.
98 Id. at 509 ("A naive contracting party may take the contract offer as given and
passively expand her view of the world to include all the terms in the contract of
which she was previously unaware."); see also Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 93
("One consequence of the failure to recognize the absence of information is that
people may not moderate their judgments as they tend to do when the
incompleteness of knowledge is recognized. In addition, they may have more
confidence their judgments than would have been the case if the absence of
important information had been detected.").
99 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 17 (1st
ed. 1993) ("The rule says that we should try to repay, in kind, what another person
has provided us."); see also James R. Holbrook, Using Performative, Distributive,
Integrative, and Transformative Principles in Negotiation, 56 LoY. L. REv. 359,
368 (2010) ("This rule [of reciprocity] states that, when one party acts in a specific
way, the other party likely will react similarly."); Russell Korobkin, A Positive
Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1821-22 (2000) [hereinafter
Korobkin, Legal Negotiation] ("Perhaps the most common behavioral norm
invoked in the negotiation process is reciprocity. When one person takes some
action on behalf of another, it is assumed that the favor will be returned."); Peter
Reilly, Resistance is Not Futile: Harnessing the Power of Counter-Offensive
Tactics in Legal Persuasion, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1171, 1192 (2013) ("Through
reciprocity, people tend to repay in kind what others have provided them.");
Yelpaala, supra note 81, at 221 (asserting that "[c]ooperation and reciprocity
a ear to be not only pervasive across cultures but also to be species-typical").
1 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 21 (noting that "[t]he rule possesses awesome
strength, often producing a 'yes' response to a request that, except for an existing
feeling of indebtedness, would have surely been refused"); Adler, supra note 78, at
728 (describing the power of the norm of reciprocity in evoking undesired
concessions); Barry Goldman, Esq., The Psychology of Mediation, IV NAELA J.
115, 118 (2008) (suggesting evolutionary psychology as the basis for the strength
of the reciprocity norm, which developed to solve the problem of how to induce
cooperation among members of a species).
'01 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 21; Korobkin, Legal Negotiation, supra note 98, at
1822 (describing how fundraisers distribute free return-address stickers in order to
induce potential donors to donate).
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The reciprocity rule, though, does not require an actual initial gift
to be effective. 10 2 Instead, "[a]nother consequence of the rule ... is an
obligation to make a concession to someone who has made a concession to
us.' 103  By making a larger request followed by a smaller request, the
requesting individual is often able to secure affirmative responses to the
smaller request, even though the smaller request would have been refused if
the larger request had not preceded it. 10 4 Thus, individuals can be
influenced not based on desire in relation to the request but instead to the
framing or presentation of the request. 10 5 The reciprocity rule works in this
instance because the requesting party makes a "gift" of a concession
(moving from the larger request to the smaller request), and the party
receiving the request and concession is influenced accordingly.1
0 6
It is in this manner that the reciprocity rule can be utilized when
drafting the initial draft of the contract. Drafting attorneys should prepare
written contracts that outline more extreme positions than those ultimately
desired by the client. 0 7 If, as might be expected, the extreme positions are
102 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 36 (noting that this "is more subtle than the direct
route of providing that person with a favor and then asking for one in return; yet in
some ways it is more devastatingly effective than the straightforward approach");
Korobkin, Legal Negotiation, supra note 98, at 1822 (describing different nominal
gifts that can induce reciprocity).
M CIALDINI, supra note 98 at 37; Korobkin, Legal Negotiation, supra note 98, at
1822 ("The person who fails to reciprocate commits a social faux pas, which can
lead to social ostracism and derision.").
104 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 37 (noting an example of how "[he] changed from
noncompliant to compliant when [the requester] changed from a larger to a smaller
request, even though [he] was not really interested in either of the things [the
requester] offered"); Goldman, supra note 99, at 119 ("In other words, the
reciprocity norm is so strong that it is possible to get people to give you things you
want by giving them things they do not want and did not ask for."); Korobkin,
Legal Negotiation, supra note 98, at 1823 (noting that "it is not always clear
whether the reciprocity norm requires equivalent concessions"); Reilly, supra note
98, at 1226 (suggesting that individuals may be able to resist unattractive options
only by evaluating all anchors separately).
'05 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 37; Birke & Fox, supra note 61, at 46 (noting that
"the attractiveness of potential agreements may be influenced by the way in which
Rains and losses are packaged").
CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 38 ("Provided that you have structured your requests
skillfully, I should view your second request as a concession to me and should feel
inclined to respond with a concession of my own"); Holbrook, supra note 98, at
370 ("The negotiator can avoid such an impasse [a breakdown in bargaining] by
understanding that the norm of reciprocity requires each party to make a productive
move to continue to narrow the gap between them.").
107 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 38 (describing the "rejection-then-retreat
technique"); Korobkin, Legal Negotiation, supra note 98, at 1822 ("A common
negotiating tactic is to make an extreme opening offer, perhaps one that is far
outside of the bargaining zone, in the hopes of then invoking the reciprocity norm
to reach an advantageous deal point."); Rudolf Vetschera et al., An Analytical
Approach to Offer Generation in Concession-Based Negotiation Processes, 23
GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 71, 78 (2014) (describing typical negotiation formulas
based on initial offers followed by a series of concessions).
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rejected by the reviewing attorney, then the drafting attorney can "retreat"
to the desired position. This concession should be expected to be interpreted
as a "gift" that will influence the reviewing attorney to agree to the desired
position. 0 8 In addition, the contrast principle suggests that the reviewing
attorney will be influenced by the appearance of the desired position
alongside of the initial extreme position.'0 9 By comparison, the desired
position will seem less extreme than it otherwise would have (if the extreme
position had not been presented at all)."0 The contrast principle and
reciprocity rule thus can work together to influence the reviewing attorney
if the initial extreme position in a draft is followed by a concession, even if
the concession is unrelated."' The concession can influence through
perception as a gift, while the concession makes the position retreated to
appear less extreme. 1 2 Thus, as in other negotiations, the initial positions
presented in the first draft of the contract may be a way to obtain actual
concessions from the other side." 3
108 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 38; Korobkin, Legal Negotiation, supra note 98, at
1823 (describing how concessions from an initial bargaining position can induce
the opposing party to make concessions).
109 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 11-12 (describing how the "contrast principle ...
affects the way we see the difference between two things that are presented one
after another. Simply put, if the second item is fairly different from the first, we
will tend to see it as more different than it actually is"); Chris Guthrie, Using
Bargaining for Advantage in Law School Negotiation Courses, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 219, 232 (2000) [hereinafter Guthrie, Negotiation Courses]
(describing how "contrast effects" and the "reciprocity norm" support making
"optimistic, rather than moderate, opening offers in many negotiations"); Reilly,
supra note 98, at 1225 (describing the "door-in-the-face" influence, which
"involves making a request so large it is very likely to be rejected. However,
immediately following the rejection, a smaller request is made [and is more likely
to be accepted]").
110 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 42; Guthrie, Negotiation Courses, supra note 108
("Psychologists have discovered that people tend to evaluate an option more
favorably when it is compared to an inferior option than when it is evaluated in the
absence of such options."); Reilly, supra note 98, at 1226 (noting that a "large
request presents a high reference anchor against which the smaller, follow-up
request can be favorably judged").
111 Birke & Fox, supra note 61, at 51-52 (discussing the importance in negotiations
of the knowledge that "people tend to reciprocate acts of kindness, even when the
original kindness is uninvited and of no value to the recipient").112 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 42 ("Not only will [a] five-dollar request [after a
larger ten-dollar request] be viewed as a concession to be reciprocated, it will also
look to you like a smaller request than if [the requester] had just asked for it
straightaway."); Guthrie, Negotiation Courses, supra note 108, at 233 (describing
the combined use of contrasts and reciprocity).113 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 40 (noting how "[l]abor negotiators, for instance,
often use the tactic of beginning with extreme demands that they do not actually
expect to win but from which they can retreat in a series of seeming concessions
designed to draw real concessions from the opposing side"); Birke & Fox, supra
note 61, at 51-52 (suggesting that attorneys negotiating a civil settlements should
"make an optimistic first offer in order to leave room for concessions that will be
expected by the other side (in response to concessions that they will make).
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In this scenario, loss aversion also may be relevant. Loss aversion
refers to a greater desire for parties to avoid losses than to seek gains.,
14
Both parties will generally be seeking to avoid suffering losses in what may
appear to be a zero-sum game. 1 5 When responding to the initial draft of the
contract, the non-drafting party will be seeking particular concessions from
the drafting party and seeking to avoid particular losses imposed upon his
client. For example, the drafting party may have proposed a non-
competition covenant to be binding upon the non-drafting party's client. If
the non-drafting party seeks to remove the covenant or reduce the scope or
term of the covenant, then the non-drafting party will realize a gain. The
drafting attorney's client, however, will suffer a corresponding loss to the
extent of such removal or reduction. Accordingly, the drafting attorney
needs to be able to create "reference points" that permit the negotiation over
the painful allocation of "losses" to be as favorable as possible. i 6 For
example, the non-competition covenant may be unimportant to the drafting
party. The portrayal, true or not, of this provision as important to the
drafting party's client can influence the non-drafting party (and client) to
make concessions in other areas of the contract or even to concede the
existence of some weaker form of the non-competition covenant.
17
Accordingly, the drafting party should attempt to stake out as many
possible positions in the initial draft, even if many of those positions are not
important to the drafting party's client. The multitude of positions
communicate "reference points" to the other side that can be used as
"bargaining chips" to be conceded and portrayed as concessionary losses
Second, it is important to resist the temptation to reciprocate meaningless or
negligible concessions."); Guthrie, Negotiation Courses, supra note 108, at 233
("Starting optimistically also permits the party making the opening offer to
capitalize on the reciprocity norm, an informal social rule that says 'we should try
to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us."').
KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 302 ("Loss aversion refers to the relative strength
of two motives: we are driven more strongly to avoid losses than to achieve
gains."); Korobkin, Inertia, supra note 62, at 1620 ("Loss aversion theory posits
that the utility consequences to individuals of suffering a 'loss' from a reference
point will be greater than an equivalent 'gain' from the same reference point. If
losses loom larger than gains, it follows logically that anticipated regret would
loom larger than anticipated rejoicing.").
115 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 304 (noting the difficulty in negotiations
involving a "shrinking pie... because they require an allocation of losses"); Birke
& Fox, supra note 61, at 44 (describing the difficulty negotiators may have
(because of loss aversion and other factors) in making effective "tradeoffs
necessary for them to achieve joint gains").
116 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 304 ("Many of the messages that negotiators
exchange in the course of bargaining are attempts to communicate a reference point
and provide an anchor to the other side.").
117 Id. at 305 ("Because negotiators are influenced by a norm of reciprocity, a
concession that is presented as painful calls for an equally painful (and perhaps
equally inauthentic) concession from the other side.").
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later.1 8  The drafting party also should stake out positions that
communicate significant attachment to these various positions. A seven
year non-competition covenant to be imposed on the non-drafting
attorney's client communicates a much higher level of attachment (by the
drafting attorney's client) to the covenant than a one year term would. By
signaling a higher level of attachment to different provisions and then
making concessions with respect to those terms that are unimportant to the
client, the drafting attorney may find it easier to obtain concessions in the
areas that are important to the client. Even if the drafting attorney's client
does not desire a non-competition covenant from the other party, cognitive
science suggests that the drafting attorney should include such a covenant
and one that (falsely) communicates its importance to the non-drafting
attorney (and client).
The initial draft of a contract could also be an information-seeking
device.119 Based on the response received by the opposing counsel, the
drafting attorney can attempt to ascertain the level of sophistication of the
opposing counsel as well as the desire by the opposing party to consummate
the transaction. This information could be known, of course, such as in the
instance of where a large company is bidding to purchase another company
while utilizing the services of a large corporate law firm. In other instances,
though, the drafting attorney may utilize an aggressive draft where the
parties or attorneys are not as familiar.
Thus, the initial draft. is an important tool that is capable of
establishing a position capable of being accepted that is more favorable
than actually desired (the reviewing attorney could always accept it) as well
as provide a position from which to retreat and increase the likelihood that
the desired position is accepted. This tool provides a significant advantage
from both a psychological and structural standpoint.
120
118 Id. at 304 ("The messages [during negotiations] are not always sincere.
Negotiators often pretend intense attachment to some good ... although they
actually view that good as a bargaining chip and intend ultimately to give it away
in an exchange."); Goldman, supra note 100, at 119 (describing the practice of
labor negotiators "bringing in a laundry list of demands to collective bargaining
negotiations .... They are there so they can be conceded, and so that the concession
can prompt a reciprocal concession from the employer on an issue that has real
importance to the union").
119 Wendi L. Adair & Jeanne M. Brett, The Negotiation Dance. Time, Culture, and
Behavioral Sequences in Negotiation, 16 ORG. SC. 1, 35 (2005) ("[I]t is not
surprising that negotiators begin negotiations by testing whether the other party is
going to be competitive or cooperative before they begin revealing information
about positions and interests that should move them toward agreement but could
make them vulnerable if the other is competitive.").
120 CIALDINI, supra note 98, at 45:
By beginning with a [larger] request, I really can't lose. If you agree
to it, I will have gotten [more] from you [than] I would have settled
for. If, on the other hand, you turn down my initial request, I can
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IV. THE SITUATION OF CONTRACT REVIEW
A-drafting attorney should also be cognizant of the situation in
which the opposing attorney is operating. There is a growing body of
literature that is instructive as to the influence that one's situation has upon
one's actions, as opposed to the classical idea of the rational actor with
unfettered free will. This Section will explore the different situational
pressures, as well as moral hazards, faced by the reviewing attorney.
A. Situational Pressures
In general, people are subject to the fundamental attribution error,
which is the error individuals make when determining the cause of their
own and others' behavior. 2 ' Individuals typically ascribe the blame for
others' behavior to "internal" or "dispositional" factors, while attributing
their own negative behavior to external causes.122 Instead of recognizing the
retreat.. .and, through the... reciprocity and contrast principles,
greatly enhance my likelihood of success. Either way, I benefit; it's a
case of heads I win, tails you lose. Id.
Accord Charles B. Craver, The Negotiation Process, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoC. 271,
283 (2003) ("When in doubt, negotiators should select more, rather than less,
extreme opening positions. It is far easier to retreat from excessive positions than it
is to counteract the negative impact of inappropriately diminished offers.").
121 LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4 (1991) (describing the fundamental
attribution error as "[p]eople's inflated belief in the importance of personality traits
and dispositions, together with their failure to recognize the importance of
situational factors in affecting behavior"); Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey,
Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569,
569 (1988) ("We are ingenious in 'discovering' the defect of character we believe
would account for a person's misfortune.") (quoting Antoine Arnauld, THE ART OF
THINKING: PORT-ROYAL LOGIC 285 (1964)); Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of
Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and
Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 127 (1995) ("[T]he 'fundamental attribution
error' [is] the tendency inappropriately to attribute the behavior of another person
to her corresponding dispositions or traits (i.e., 'the sort of person she is') rather
than to the circumstances in which she finds herself, including role demands.")
(citation omitted); David C. Funder, Errors and Mistakes: Evaluating the Accuracy
of Social Judgment, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 75, 78 (1987)(describing "the putative
tendency for people to overestimate the influence of attitudes and personality on
behavior, and to underestimate the power of the situation. It is typically
demonstrated by experiments that show how subjects will draw inferences about
the personalities of rating targets on the basis of insufficient information")
(citations omitted); Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
717, 738 (1998) (noting that the error "causes human decision-makers to attribute
too much importance to dispositions, and to overlook situational influences").
122 Feigenson, supra note 121, at 86 ("People tend to attribute other people's
behavior and its (negative) consequences to those people's enduring dispositions or
traits, while attributing their own behavior and its (negative) consequences to the
circumstances."); Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence
Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 21 (1995) ("When people observe behavior, they
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influence of the situation for another's behavior or unfortunate outcome, an
outside observer typically will instead determine that the other person's
actions or outcome were caused by the other person's underlying
personality. 123
If, however, the drafting attorney is aware of the power of the
situation, then she can exploit the situation to her advantage and to the
detriment of the non-drafting attorney (and the non-drafting attorney's
client). 124 Knowledge of such constraints or pressures facing opposing
counsel can be helpful in securing favorable contractual terms.
For example, the non-drafting attorney's client may be highly
motivated to engage in the proposed transaction with the drafting party's
client. This is an issue that the drafting attorney can uncover by inquiring
with her client. 25 There may be obvious reasons, then, for the opposing
party to signal its willingness to cooperate and work constructively with a
new prospective transaction partner. When beginning a new relationship or
proposing a transaction, it may be important to "sell" the other party on
often conclude that the person who performed the behavior was predisposed to do
so-that the person's behavior corresponds to the person's unique dispositions-
and they draw such conclusions even when a logical analysis suggests they should
not.").
123 Gilbert & Malone, supra note 121, at 22 ("[W]hen people do precisely what the
physical environment or the social situation demands, dispositional inferences are
logically unwarranted. This simple rule is eminently reasonable, but, as with the
interstate speed limit, someone seems to have neglected to tell the drivers.");
Prentice, supra note 79, at 404 ("Personal factors tend to drift to the fore, whereas
situational factors tend to fade into the background."); Alan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of
Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1444 (1983) (explaining
one example of the fundamental error is "to attribute an honest act to an honest
disposition rather than to the presence of factors that encourage honesty such as the
monitoring of behavior or the need for the approval of others").
124 Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L.
REv. 129, 333 (2003) (noting that "people systematically-and often quite
erroneously-attribute causation, responsibility, and blame to the most visible
actors in a given situation," which is compounded by mistakenly "assuming that
action is attributable to disposition, rather than situation"); Tetlock, supra note 70,
at 464 ("People prefer dispositional explanations because such explanations
typically come first to mind, and people rarely consider less obvious situational
ones."). This Article suggests that, as in other contexts, where sellers of products
and services "will respond to market incentives by manipulating consumer
perceptions in whatever manner maximizes profits," Hanson & Kysar, supra note
79, at 743, we should expect sellers to respond to the same market incentives to
prepare contracts to manipulate non-drafting attorney perceptions and responses.Similarly, the attorney would want to obtain information from her client as to
whether the drafting attorney's client otherwise has more bargaining power or
leverage in the transaction.
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such characteristics in order to secure the relationship or transaction.
126
Thus, the non-drafting attorney's client may be reluctant to send back a
revised draft with a lot of comments, or one that otherwise suggests the
non-drafting attorney's client will be a difficult negotiating party, not to
mention a difficult transaction or relationship partner. 2 7 Consequently, the
non-drafting attorney's client may instruct her attorney to employ a "light
touch" to the agreement when revising it. Armed with the knowledge that
her client has superior bargaining power with respect to the desire to
consummate the transaction, the drafting attorney can prepare a more one-
sided contract than what might be possible or preferred if the parties were
situated differently.
Similarly, in private auctions for the sale of a company, the selling
company's broker often requires a bid that includes the proposed purchase
price as well as a complete "mark-up" of the draft purchase agreement
prepared by the selling company's attorney. 2 8 In this instance, it is clear
that any prospective bidders are interested in the transaction, and that the
seller has leverage where multiple bidders are present.129 Prospective
bidders may be reluctant to "lose" the auction because their revisions to the
draft purchase agreement suggest that they may be difficult to work with
and may cloud the possibility of a closing. 130 This may be particularly true
to the extent that particular purchase agreement provisions do not relate to
126 See Adair & Brett, supra note 119, at 35 (describing one approach that
negotiators take by disclosing "a little sensitive information about their preferences
and priorities to signal cooperation and the willingness to develop trust").
127 Dent, Strategic Alliances, supra note 76, at 954 (noting that some clients "want
a simpler contract because they don't want the hard bargaining that will erode
trust").
128 Steven L. Good & Sheldon Gottlieb, Real Estate Auctions: A Guide for the
Seller's Lawyer, 2 PROB. & PROP. 41, 42 (1988) (noting that, in an auction for real
estate, "the seller's lawyer prepares the sales contract before the auction and the
contract is generally not subject to negotiation. In effect, the roles of the lawyers
are reversed; the seller's lawyer drafts the contract for sale and the buyer's lawyer
approves or disapproves the contract's format"); Steven L. Good & Celeste M.
Hammond, Real Estate Auctions - Legal Concerns for an Increasingly Preferred
Method of Selling Real Property, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 772 (2006)
discussing process for preparing the purchase agreement in a real estate auction).
29 Schuyler Carroll & Ronni Arnold, Understanding Buyer and Seller Concerns
for Transactions Involving Distressed Businesses, in BUYING AND SELLING
DISTRESSED BUSINESSES: LEADING LAWYERS ON EVALUATING ASSETS AND
IDENTIFYING BUYERS, NEGOTIATING DEALS, AND ADVISING DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS ON FIDUCIARY DUTIES 1 (2009) ("[I]n a contested auction, which is an
auction with multiple bidders, a bidder has less leverage than an auction in which
there is only one buyer. The business terms of the transaction will reflect thisdO!amic.").
Id (noting that, in a contested auction, "[a] simplified offer makes the bidder's
proposal as attractive as possible to the seller and other interested parties which, in
turn, fewer representations and warranties setting the parameters within which a
transaction will be approved").
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the "core" business deal (such as purchase price calculation and timing).' 3'
Accordingly, the bidders' attorneys may be pressured to make very few
revisions and only in "important" areas. The selling company's attorney,
cognizant of the pressures faced by such attorneys, can draft a contract that
is advantageous in the "important" areas as well as those likely to be
ignored by opposing attorneys drafting under such pressure.
132
Time pressure may also be a situational constraint on the reviewing
attorney's ability to resist a one-sided draft. 133 If the other attorney will not
131 Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and Interpretation Rules:
The Needfor a Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB. L. REv. 506, 543
(2005) (noting that, with respect to form contracts, "[r]equests to change seemingly
inconsequential provisions may be met with suspicion or hostility").
132 Good & Gottlieb, supra note 128, at 42 ("In such circumstances [a contested
auction], the seller's lawyer is often tempted to draft a contract heavily weighted
toward the seller."). Interestingly, prospective bidders may include memoranda that
explain the proposed changes to the revised draft. See Scott B. Connolly et al.,
Auctions: From the Bidder's Perspective, DRINKER BIDDLE,
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/Templates/media/files/publications/2010/auctions-
from-the-bidders-perspective.pdf at 3 ("Instead of sending a full mark-up of the
acquisition agreement, the bidder may be required to or may choose to submit an
issues list indicating specific points that the bidder wants to negotiate."). These
memoranda, by describing the bidders' motivations and justifying the changes, may
be important less as a strictly informative device regarding the nature of the
changes as opposed to a signaling device designed to inform the sellers that the
bidders have good intentions, are thoughtful negotiators, and will be good
transaction partners. Id. at 4 ("The decision of how to comply with bidding
procedures [such as the seller's request for a full and final mark-up] is often
determined by the bidder's perceived leverage and desire to close the
transaction."). Such memoranda or issues lists also, from the bidders' perspective,
do not commit the bidders to a particular formulation of the draft and allow the
bidders to revise with more thought and possibly more bargaining power after the
bid has been secured. Id. ("Because submitting a full mark-up is virtually
impossible without the acceptance of significant risk and the incurrence of
substantial costs by a bidder, many bidders opt to submit detailed mark-ups or
issues lists that focus on conceptual issues rather than specific language.").133 Gerrit M. Beckhaus, "Comply or Explain "--A Flexible Mechanism to
Countervail Behavioral Biases in M&A Transactions, 21 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REv.
183, 191 (2013) ("In general, M&A [merger and acquisition] transactions involve a
multitude of typically highly complex decisions, which are made under great
uncertainty and time pressure."); E.A. Bernstein, supra note 17, at 232
("Contracting decisions are almost always made in the shadow of a time
deadline."); Kim, supra note 130, at 543 (describing how sellers may require
bidder's offers (and deposits) to be conditioned upon closing by a certain date, "so
a delay [arising from buyer changing the agreement or otherwise] might enable the
seller to keep the buyer's good faith deposit or put the property back on the
market"); Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in
Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 66-67 (1985) (noting the power of time
pressure in the context of settling lawsuits). The power of time to review has been
noted in the consumer contract context. For example, it is has been noted that
consumer contracts are often presented to consumers in those situations where they
are unwilling or unlikely to spend a lot of time reviewing the contract. See Shmuel
I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting
in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
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have a lot of time to review, consider, and revise the initial contract draft,
then the drafting attorney may be inclined to draft a more lengthy and
complicated draft. This may occur, for example, in the company auction
situation where the bidding client has determined that, after completing its
preliminary financial and other due diligence, it would like to make a bid.
In such an instance, the reviewing attorney may not be engaged to review
the purchase agreement until the client has made such a decision. 3 4 To the
extent that the decision to bid is made late in the process, the reviewing
attorney may not have sufficient time to complete an exhaustive review of
the contract prior to the deadline for submitting bids. 35 Again, the leverage
of multiple bidders, fear of losing the transaction for "non-business" (legal)
reasons, and time may influence or impact a reviewing attorney's ability to
resist a one-sided contract draft.
136
Other situational pressures may exist as well. In the next Section,
this Article addresses situational pressures that may exist because of a
moral hazard facing the reviewing attorney.
303, 313 (2008) (noting that "in many instances consumers enter SFCs [standard
form contracts] under unfavorable circumstances.., frequently characterized by
noise, time constraints and vendors' attempts to manipulate consumers"); Robert A.
Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age,
77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429,446 (2002) ("Reading and understanding boilerplate terms
is difficult and time consuming for consumers... [T]o make matters worse,
consumers commonly encounter standard forms when they are in a hurry."); Erin
A. O'Hara, Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for Online
Consumer-Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1883, 1920-21 (2005) ("The difficulty
with the process by which consumers enter into standard-form arrangements stems
from the fact that the vendor ... presents those terms in a take-it-or-leave it fashion
to the consumer who is in a hurry to complete the transaction.").
134 Alan R. Kravets, Going, Going, Gone! Real Estate Auctions in the 90s, 7 PROB.
& PROP. 38, 42 (1993) ("Few buyers are represented at any auction because of the
cost and because there is nothing to negotiate .... After the auction, the buyer's
lawyer will represent the buyer as if in a typical real estate closing."). This may
explain why sellers are able to propose initial drafts of purchase agreements, as
opposed to traditional sales, where "[t]he etiquette in an acquisition is for the
P3urchaser's attorney to draft the basic agreement." FREUND, supra note 47, at 27.
Birke & Fox, supra note 61, at 56 ("Opportunities often seem more valuable
when they are less available .... Threats to freedom can take the form of time
limits, supply limits, and competition. In negotiation, these tactics can be a
particularly effective means of gaining compliance."); Gifford, supra note 133, at
66 ("Social scientists' research shows that time pressures result in lower demands,
faster concessions, and lower aspiration levels.").
136 Beckhaus, supra note 132, at 191 ("The time pressure [in mergers and
acquisitions transactions] results from the costs of the transaction process, potential
competitors for the target company, the respective market situation, a fixed time
frame or the need for secrecy [which]... increase the probability of irrational
behavior in decision-making processes .. "); Birke & Fox, supra note 61, at 56
("Savvy negotiators can dramatize their alternatives by entertaining competing
bids, or they can strategically impose artificial time limits for negotiation.").
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B. The Moral Hazards Facing the Non-Drafting Attorney
It also is worthwhile for the drafting attorney to be aware of the
moral hazard that may face the non-drafting attorney. The non-drafting
attorney, as any other economic agent (in this instance of the client), may
be inclined, and is able, to act in a manner that is not optimal for the
client.1 37 Because the client is relying on the non-drafting attorney for
advice with respect to the draft, the non-drafting attorney has more
information and control regarding whether the non-drafting attorney is
performing as the client would desire.
138
In this instance, however, the attorney's interests may not be
aligned with the client's (presumably, securing the most favorable
contractual terms). 13 9 The attorney, for example, may desire to utilize a
lower level of care when reviewing the initial draft of the contract than
otherwise might be desired by the principal, in particular where the attorney
is being compensated on a per-transaction (or contingent) as opposed to an
hourly basis.' 40 Where the underlying compensation for the attorney is the
137 See supra Sections II.B and II.C.
138 See supra Sections II.B and II.C; Richman, supra note 7, at 77 (noting the
conventional conclusion that "whenever we observe contracts that appear to be
suboptimal, we blame agency costs" arising from attorney-client relationships).139 E.A. Bernstein, supra note 17, at 235 (describing the different risk profiles of
attorneys and clients, and resulting agency problems); J.M. Klein, supra note 3, at
352 ("[T]he ability of a lawyer to impact his or her own compensation creates the
potential for a conflict of interest."). For example, attorneys "may fear losing the
client if a remote contingency occurs more than they fear transaction breakdown
that can be attributed to opposing counsel, they may not know the client's
circumstances, or they may simply be inexperienced." E.A. Bernstein, supra note
17, at 235-36. Similarly, attorneys may fear losing the client following the
consummation of a particular transaction (such as when a public company is taken
private), which provides an economic incentive to "scuttle the deal." J.M. Klein,
supra note 3, at 355-56.
14 Hill, supra note 67, at 71 (describing law firm resistance to innovations in
existing forms of contracts as being based on lawyers' desire to avoid a "bad
outcome for which the lawyer is blamed." Consequently, "avoiding a bad outcome
is tantamount to a good enough outcome"); Anthony J. Sebok & W. Bradley
Wendel, Duty in the Litigation-investment Agreement: The Choice Between Tort
and Contract Norms When the Deal Breaks Down, 66 VAND. L. REv. 1831, 1852
(2013) (comparing the incentives of attorneys in hourly and contingent
compensation arrangements and concluding that contingency fee arrangements
incentivizes attorneys "to work fewer hours to maximize the effective hourly rate
obtained by working on the client's matter. A contingent fee arrangement therefore
leads to suboptimal levels of attorney effort"); George B. Shepherd & Morgan
Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
91, 107 (1999) ("Under a fixed-fee contract, the lawyer has an incentive to
economize on her time .... By spending additional time on this client's matter, the
lawyer sacrifices income that she could have earned by instead devoting the time to
other matters.").
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same regardless of the amount of effort, the incentive to shirk is
heightened.
14 1
Similarly, the non-drafting attorney presumably has an interest in
maintaining the client relationship. If the attorney is being used for one
transaction, presumably the attorney might be used for a future
transaction. 4 As a result, there is a desire to please the principal (the
client). This might induce the non-drafting attorney to revise the contract in
a manner that minimizes the possibility of the revisions disrupting the
transaction. Of course, the attorney will certainly lose the client if it turns
out that the attorney's revisions were not sufficient to protect the client's
interests, but the attorney may view that possibility as a low probability
risk.
143
In another context, the drafting attorney may be a client referral
source for the reviewing attorney or even the referral source for the contract
review matter itself, which also can lead to a conflict of interest for the
reviewing attorney. 44 For example, if there are multiple investors in a
141 Of course, a different conflict of interest is present where the attorney is
compensated on an hourly basis. Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 140, at 108 ("In
contrast, the hourly contract creates a strong incentive for the lawyer to conduct
unnecessary work .... Moral hazard exists because the lawyer profits from each
additional hour that the lawyer devotes to the client's matter, regardless of whether
the additional hour benefits the client.").
142 This is particularly true when law firm partners feel less secure in their positions
at the firm based on changed economic conditions or firm structures. See Stephen
M. Bainbridge, The Tournament at the Intersection of Business and Legal Ethics, I
U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 909, 921 (2004):
"Compensation based on business generation means that partners are
more vulnerable to shifting market conditions. Factors over which a
lawyer may have no control, such as the merger of her client into
another company, a corporation's decision to assign more work to its
legal department, or a downturn in a particular economic sector
(witness Internet start-ups) may significantly reduce her
compensation."
Id. (quoting Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary Law Firm
Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 931, 937 (2002). Bainbridge concludes, with
respect to reporting client fraud, "[b]ecause an individual partner is even more
likely than a firm to be dependent on billings to a single major client, the eat-what-
you-kill phenomenon makes it highly unlikely that such a partner will risk
antagonizing key clients absent the proverbial smoking gun-and maybe not even
then." Id. These same considerations, however, can apply in the contract review
context. Attorneys desiring to keep important clients happy about the transaction
may be reluctant to kill a transaction by being too aggressive when reviewing the
draft acquisition agreement.143 See supra Section III.C for a discussion of regret theory and optimism bias.
144 Carolyn M. Dillinger, Use Strategic Networking to Build Your Customized Book
of Business, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., July 2008, at 10 (describing the referral
relationship that often exists between different types of attorneys), available at
http://www.ocbar.org/OCLawyer/Articlelndex/2008Articlelndex.aspx; Glen
McMurry & Adam Krumholz, What's Next? The Transition from Law School to
Solo or Firm Practice, FED. LAW., May 2012, at 18 (advising new attorneys to
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project, the lead investor's attorney may represent the investor group with
respect to agreements between the seller and the group. As to matters
between the investors such as a shareholder agreement, however, it is
common for each investor to retain her own attorney to avoid conflicts of
interest. 145 In such an instance, the lead investor or the lead investor's
attorney may suggest particular attorneys for the other investors to utilize
with respect to the shareholder agreement. In such an instance, an attorney
that was referred the matter may be inclined to suggest fewer revisions to
avoid disruption of the transaction or otherwise displease the referral
source, with the underlying desire to secure future referrals. 46 The party or
attorney that referred the matter to the reviewing attorney may also be able
to take advantage of the norm of reciprocity discussed in Section III.E
supra, which suggests that the reviewing attorney may feel obligated to
concede or otherwise "give" something to the referral source because
something (the contract review matter or other client matters) was given to
her.
V. CONSTRAINTS ON DRAFTING ADVANTAGES
The cognitive biases and situational pressures discussed in this
Article are not to suggest that the reviewing attorney is unable to
understand or resist contracts drafted to exploit them. There also may exist
similar biases or situational pressures facing the drafting attorney that
constrain such opportunistic behavior.
A. Expertise
First, the general expertise of a reviewing attorney, particular of an
experienced attorney, may suggest an ability to resist some of the cognitive
biases that may otherwise be suffered by their clients, such as the optimism
develop relationships with other attorneys to build their referral network); Deborah
L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665, 681-82 (1994)
(noting lawyers' "priority on maintaining good relationships with other members of
their community or participants in the legal process").145 1-1 Corporate Attorney's Practice Guide § 1.04 ("For example, if the owner-
managers wish to enter into partnership agreements, shareholder agreements, or
employment agreements, each party should have independent counsel during the
negotiation of these agreements, unless the conflict is waived by all of thep4arties.").46 Rhode, supra note 144, at 682:
Inadequate representation of client interests is also common where
lawyers place priority on maintaining good relationships with other
members of their community or participants in the legal process. If
zealous pursuit of any single matter will antagonize individuals
whose continuing cooperation or client referrals is important,
attorneys may adjust their partisanship accordingly.
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bias. 4 7 This may be particularly true when the attorney is not facing a
moral hazard or other situational pressures, such as those described in
Section IV supra.14 8 Experience in a particular area may enable a higher
level of analysis because of the lower level of cognitive effort that an expert
requires to address an issue. 149 This may permit reviewing attorneys to
resist time pressure and issue complexity as advantages for the drafting
attorney. 1
50
Knowledge of the general market practices may also inform a
reviewing attorney as to what revisions are "appropriate" and unlikely to be
challenged or perceived as disruptive to the transaction.' 5 ' For example,
147 Orr & Guthrie, supra note 52, at 622 (noting that their study "results suggest
that this influence [anchoring] is somewhat diminished by the presence of
additional information and negotiator experience"); Rachlinski, supra note 5, at
1217 ("Experienced attorneys have had many chances to develop superior ways of
evaluating decisions and using these decisionmaking skills for their clients'
benefit."); but see Birke & Fox, supra note 61, at 10 ("People are especially
susceptible to anchoring bias when they have little relevant experience or
knowledge. However, expertise alone fails to provide protection from this
tendency."); Zev J. Eigen & Yair Listokin, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own
Hype, and Should They? A Natural Experiment, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 239, 241 (2012)
("Substantial optimism bias persists among lawyers even when they are randomly
assigned to sides of a case."); Richardson, supra note 53, at 427 ("A number of
studies have shown that negotiators are affected by anchoring as much as
individual decision-makers are."); Orr & Guthrie, supra note 52, at 627 ("This is
not to say that lawyers are pure 'rational actors' who are impervious to the effects
of anchoring and other heuristics and biases; in fact, lawyers, like others, are
susceptible to such biases.").
148 Orr & Guthrie, supra note 52, at 626 & 628 (finding "evidence that information
and expertise can mitigate the effects of an anchor" and noting "lawyers may be
better able than others to resist biases, including anchoring"); Rachlinski, supra
note 5, at 1216-17 ("Attorneys situated somewhat outside of the decisionmaking
environment, can see multiple frames and other perspectives more easily than
clients."). Lawyers may especially be well-positioned to resist the effects of
anchoring because they "are likely to feel accountable to their clients," and
research suggests such feelings help avoid anchoring. Accordingly, "[t]his suggests
that lawyers are more likely to avoid anchoring than their clients (and, indeed, that
lawyers may be better able to avoid anchoring when negotiating on behalf of
clients than when negotiating on their own behalf)." Orr & Guthrie, supra note 52,
at 628.
149 See generally Joseph W. Alba & J. Wesley Hutchinson, Dimensions of
Consumer Expertise, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 411,423 (1987) (describing multiple
hVotheses that explain experts' cognitive advantages over novices).
See id. at 423 exhibit 3 ("Time pressure, information complexity, and low
motivation inhibit analytic processing; however, because product familiarity
generally reduces cognitive effort and frees up cognitive resources, these effects are
9r eater for novices than for experts.").
See id. at 437 exhibit 5 (hypothesizing that "the superior ability of experts to
identify relevant information results in qualitative differences in the information
used by experts and novices during memory-based decision making"); Susan T.
Fiske, Donald R. Kinder & W. Michael Larter, The Novice and the Expert:
Knowledge-based Strategies in Political Cognition, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 381, 384 (1983)("[N]ot only do experts know more than novices, but
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statistics concerning the prevalence of different types of purchase
agreement provisions, such as indemnification limits, purchase price
adjustments, and warranty survival periods are published on a regular
basis. 112 Not only will these statistics inform the reviewing attorney as to
what revisions are appropriate or are readily accepted, the statistics
themselves also may induce the reviewing attorney to suggest the particular
changes.153 These statistics suggest to reviewing attorneys particular norms
within an area of practice, and an otherwise uncertain reviewing attorney
may tend to rely on the "social proof' of what others do or have done in
such situations. 154 Attorneys also might be particularly risk-averse and
overestimate the likelihood of remote events, which suggests that they will
be somewhat conservative in their advice with respect to a contract draft.1 55
B. The Situation of Drafting
The situation of negotiating the contract may also act to constrain
the drafting attorney's behavior. Just as the non-drafting attorney does not
want to be perceived by her client as holding up the transaction, this same
pressure exists for the drafting attorney. Accordingly, acting as an
important constraint on the ability of drafters to insert extreme positions is
the risk of appearing unreasonable. The drafting attorney faces the risk that
the reviewing attorney will inform her client that the drafting attorney's
also their knowledge is more tightly organized. Thus, despite the greater quantity of
information available to them, they can handle it more efficiently.").
152 See, e.g., WILSON CHU & JESSICA PEARLMAN, MERGERS &ACQUISITIONS: MKT.
TRENDS SUBCOMM., A.B.A., 2013 U.S. PRIVATE TARGET M&A DEAL POINTS
STUDY; MATT SPENCER ET AL., HOULIHAN LOKEY MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
GROUP, PURCHASE AGREEMENT STUDY FOR TRANSACTIONS COMPLETED IN 2012
AND PRIOR YEARS (2013), available at http://www.hl.com/email/pdf/cf20l3-
purchase-agreement-study.pdf.See Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 93, at 78 ("[R]elative to novices, experts are
more aware of the relevance of information for performing a given cognitive task
and are more likely to attend to all relevant information."); Fiske et al., supra note
150, at 385 ("All this suggests that experts, compared to novices, may take
inconsistent information more into account when making inferences from material
that is a balanced mix of consistent and inconsistent information .... If so, experts
also should recall greater amounts of inconsistent information.").
154 Chris Guthrie, Principles of Influence in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 829,
833 (2004) (summarizing these conditions as elucidated by Caldini); PLOUS, supra
note 53, at 201-02 (describing conformity effects). Lawyers and other experts also
may be better equipped to detect the (purposeful) absence of important provisions
in a draft of a contract. See Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 93, at 78 ("Because of
their greater sensitivity to relevant information, individuals high in knowledge may
be more likely to detect the absence of relevant information than individuals low in
knowledge.").
155 Hill, supra note 67, at 73 ("Many lawyers in large firms, even some at relatively
senior levels, seem to assign higher probabilities to certain bad events than is
warranted .... If many lawyers overestimate the probability of bad events, they
might practice law defensively.").
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draft is extremely one-sided and that the drafting attorney's client should be
so informed, which could result in the drafting attorney being viewed as an
impediment to the transaction. Preparing one-sided agreements can also
destroy the ability of the drafting attorney to utilize reciprocity when
making "concessions" later on in negotiations. If the drafting attorney's
initial position is too extreme, then the reviewing attorney may not interpret
any concessions made from such positions as being "real" and deserving of
reciprocation.
1 6
This relates to the importance of the contract as a trust-building
device. It has been suggested that the utility of certain contracts lies not in
their ability to obtain legal enforcement of promises but instead to create a
secure relationship between two parties. 157 To the extent the drafting
attorney short-circuits the process by proposing a draft that does not allow
such a relationship to develop, the drafting attorney's client may be
displeased or unlikely to utilize the attorney in the future.
C. Benefits vs. Costs of a One-Sided Contract
The benefits of a one-sided contract that can be secured based on
156 See supra Section III.E for a discussion of reciprocity. See also Adler, supra
note 78, at 770 ("[R]ecent research suggests.., that making first offers can
markedly improve one's outcome through the strategic use of anchoring."); Robert
S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power
Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 75-76 (2000) ("[T]here is
virtual unanimity among the experts regarding the size of one's opening offer: it
should be as high (or low) as reasonably possible. Doing so... capitalizes on
findings from psychology."); Birke & Fox, supra note 61, at 41 (suggesting that "it
is good strategy to make as extreme an opening offer as can be gotten away with,
but not so extreme that the offeror appears to be negotiating in bad faith"); Good &
Gottlieb, supra note 128, at 42 (noting that "an onerous, unfair contract may
discourage an otherwise enthusiastic potential bidder and with the result of a poor
sale or no sale").157 Iva Bozovic & Gillian K. Hadfield, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to
Build Informal Relations in Support of Innovation 8 (USC Law & Economics
Research Papers Series No. C 12-3, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1984915 (citing and agreeing
with previous studies indicating the process of negotiating a contract (a legal
enforcement mechanism for promises) "endogenously generates a level of trust
(and practical information about the value of a joint project) sufficient to support
the non-contractible commitments that make for successful collaboration in an
environment of high uncertainty"). Bozovic et al. argue that "formal contracting
can help to coordinate and improve the efficacy of informal contract enforcement
mechanisms such as the threat to terminate a valuable relationship or damage
commercial reputation." Id. at 5; Dent, Strategic Alliances, supra note 76, at 954
(noting the tension between an attorney that does not want to be blamed for an
incomplete contract which did not anticipate a future problem and the client that
wants to develop a successful "strategic alliance"); Mayer & Argyres, supra note
31, at 407 (describing one view of contracts as believing that "contracts improve
trust because the contracting process promotes expectations of cooperation and
generates commitment to the relationship").
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knowledge of an unsophisticated, inexperienced, or pressured reviewing
attorney may not outweigh some of the risks of doing so. For example, in a
sophisticated or complex transaction, it may not be helpful to have an
overly complicated agreement if the opposing attorney is not experienced.
A contractual advantage does not mean that the reviewing attorney will
assist the drafting attorney to consummate the transaction as desired.
For example, a purchase agreement between a buyer and seller
often contains representations and warranties of the seller with respect to
various issues concerning the seller, including financial, legal, and
operational issues. 58 These representations, if breached by the seller, would
permit the buyer to sue the seller for damages suffered as a result of such
breach. 59 Representations, however, also allow the buyer to conduct due
diligence and confirm that previous due diligence matches the
representations and disclosures made by the seller in the purchase
agreement. 160 In other words, knowledge of the veracity of the
representation may be more valuable to the buyer prior to the transaction
than after the transaction.
16 1
An example is a representation by the seller concerning notices of
threatened litigation or audits. 62 Obviously, the buyer would rather have
158 FREUND, supra note 47, at 148. Freund describes multiple purposes of the
representations, including laying "the groundwork for indemnification." Id. at 230-
32; Ronald S. Melamed & Edward S. Gusky, Preparing a Commercial Real Estate
Purchase Agreement: The Ins and Outs for the Seller and Purchaser, 84 MICH. B.J.
32, 34 (2005) (describing the connection between a purchaser's due diligence and a
purchase agreement's representations and warranties).
9 MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT, supra note 88, at Introductory Comment
at § 3 ("[T]he seller's representations affect the buyer's right to indemnification by
the seller and the shareholders (and other remedies) if the buyer discovers a breach
of any representation after the closing"); Rand L. Allen et al., The Various Types of
Transactions and Their Key Characteristics, DUE DILIGENCE IN GOv'T
CONTRACTOR MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS GLASS-CLE 3, 27 (2007) (describing
how "a seller bears the economic responsibility for any loss" arising from a breach
of a seller's representation).
160 MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT, supra note 88, at cmt. to § 3 (describing
how representations assist the buyer in "obtaining disclosure about the seller before
the signing of the acquisition agreement. A thorough buyer's draft elicits
information about the seller and its business relevant to the buyer's willingness to
buy"); Phillip Win. Lear et al., Representations, Warranties, Covenants,
Conditions, and Indemnities: Stitching Them Together in the Purchase Agreement,
37 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL L. INST. 3, 8 (1991) (noting that representations
function "as conditions to closing and ... as protections after closing").
161 Lear, supra note ("If the representations are untrue at the time of closing, the
non-breaching party is not obligated to close."); MODEL ASSET PURCHASE
AGREEMENT, supra note 88, at cmt. to § 3 ("The seller's representations also
provide a foundation for the buyer's right to terminate the acquisition before or at
the closing.").162 Nancy Young, A Model Asset Purchase Agreement, 43 PRAC. LAW. 33, 52
(1997)(formulating a litigation representation); Allen et al., supra note 158, at 33
(describing typical representations); Alan S. Gutterman, 28 Business Transactions
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the knowledge regarding any such notices prior to the closing so that the
buyer can evaluate the expected exposure and impact of such issues.
163
With such knowledge, the buyer may be unwilling to consummate the
transaction on the proposed terms, which suggests that the contract's ability
to provide for damages after the closing is insufficient protection for the
buyer. Accordingly, if the non-drafting attorney is unable to understand the
litigation and audit representation and explain it properly to her client, then
the fact that the drafting attorney was able to draft a one-sided contract
providing for unlimited redress in the event of a breach may be of little, or
at least less, comfort to the buyer.
In addition, a one-sided contract that is designed to exploit the
reviewing attorney's review of the contract can also be problematic when
the contracting parties have a relationship that survives the closing of the
initial transaction. As discussed in Section V.B supra, the contracting
process may be designed to create a level of trust between the contracting
parties, particularly where the parties will have a lengthy relationship.164 If
one of the parties is surprised by the legal meaning of a particular provision
(which was enabled due to deficiencies during the contract review process),
then the ongoing relationship between the parties may be undercut.1 65 The
Solutions § 111:13 (describing a litigation representation); MODEL ASSET
PURCHASE AGREEMENT, supra note 88, at § 3.18 (formulating and commenting on
a model litigation representation).
163 Due Diligence Reviews in Mergers and Acquisitions, 24 CORP. COUNS. Q. ART
7 (2008) ("If the due diligence process discovers a problem with one of the seller's
representations ... [t]he buyer may have an 'out' and be able to back out of the
deal. The buyer may also have a breach of contract suit against the seller.").
164 Bozovic & Hadfield, supra note 157, at 45 ("This is one sense in which we say
that the formal contract provides scaffolding for the informal relationship: it
supports the formation of the belief structure that underpins trust by reducing
ambiguity in the interpretation of behavior."); Carolina Cam6n, Patrick
Gottfridsson & Bo Rundh, Contracts as Cornerstones in Relationship Building, 4
INT'L J. QUALITY & SERV. SCIENCES (2012) ("One way to develop commitment
and trust could be during the process where the parties discuss the conditions for
the relationship ... The negotiation process functions as a bridge between the
parties for reaching a contract and relationship building."); Robert E. Scott,
Conflict and Cooperation in Long-term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REv. 2005, 2007
(1987) ("Parties enter into continuing contractual relationships in order to exploit
the economic benefits of long-term planning and coordination.").
165 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. R. 1 (1963)(finding that corporations do not utilize contracts to
manage ongoing relationships); Bozovic & Hadfield, supra note 157, at 32
(suggesting that, in some situations, the parties do not negotiate to classify conduct
in their contract as a breach "for purposes of settling in the shadow of expected
court-awarded damages... Rather, the formal reasoning of contract law provides a
shared and knowable procedure by which the parties can, independently, arrive at
common knowledge classifications of conduct.., to support an equilibrium in
which breach is deterred by the threat of termination of the contract"). Thus, if the
parties contemplate an ongoing relationship or one in which the ability to seek legal
recourse is unpalatable, then there may be less value in seeking a one-sided
contract as opposed to one that clearly reflects the understood and communicated
shared beliefs of the parties.
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drafting attorney, then, may be inclined to draft an agreement that clearly
details each issue for the parties as opposed to obfuscating them.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article explores the strategic implications arising from a
cognitive and social science perspective of the contract drafting and review
process. Traditional accounts of transactional attorneys assume an almost
robot-like functionality to the charged tasks of managing transaction costs,
including efficiently and effectively drafting and reviewing transaction
agreements to address contingencies and other issues. These accounts,
however, have not addressed the susceptibility of individual attorneys to
cognitive bias and situational pressures that can limit effective
representation. This may be particularly problematic if one views the
attorney as a necessary agent employed by the client (the principal) that is
intended to provide an unbiased outsider's perspective with respect to the
transactional issues that arise.
Based on an understanding of the behavioral tendencies of
individual attorneys in light of cognitive bias and situational pressure, this
Article has described how the drafting attorney may be able to secure
particular transactional advantages for her client. Accordingly, knowledge
of the variations within the attorney decision-making process in different
circumstances could help explain current contracting behavior. The battle
over which party will control the drafting process may reflect an
understanding not only of the power of the ability to choose the language
that will govern the parties' relationship, but also an implicit understanding
that setting forth an initial position will influence the opposing attorney's
(and opposing party's) response in a manner that may not be expected. As
discussed in this Article, the drafting party also can secure advantages for
her client if she is aware of the situational pressures facing the attorney
reviewing the draft. Both time pressure and the pressure to avoid appearing
to be an impediment to a deal can influence the reviewing attorney to avoid
being too aggressive in her response to an initial draft. Accordingly, this
Article has described many powerful situational and cognitive factors that
can influence contract draft review by the opposing counsel.
The critique of contract drafting and review set forth in this Article
has important implications for accepted notions of the transactional
attorney. First, this Article suggests that reviewing attorneys may not, in
certain circumstances, be effective intermediaries or outside advisors.
Given that clients employ attorneys to assist them in making decisions
based on their superior information or expertise, clients may be poorly
served to the extent that cognitive biases and situational pressures limit the
ability of the attorneys to utilize such information or expertise. Moreover,
these cognitive biases and situational pressures do not exist in a vacuum. A
drafting attorney aware of such factors can prepare contracts designed to
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exploit them in her client's favor. For that reason, the notion of the
transactional attorney as an effective "transaction cost engineer" should be
questioned. Under this model, attorneys attempt, presumably in a
systematic and rational fashion, to lower the barriers between different
parties being able to consummate the transaction as desired. This Article,
however, suggests that reviewing attorneys may not respond "rationally"
(from the client's perspective) to a draft prepared by the opposing attorney.
By attacking the ability of the reviewing attorney to respond in her client's
best interests to a contract draft, the drafting attorney may secure
transactional advantages but also may undermine the purpose and purported
benefit of, or value added by, the reviewing attorney. 66 The idea of the
attorney as an "engineer" lowering barriers to the transaction thus is
undermined.
More problematically, the reviewing attorney may not only be
viewed as an "irrational" or "manipulable" engineer, but she also can be
viewed as a transaction cost "distorter." If the draft or context of an
agreement influences a reviewing attorney to respond less effectively to her
client's interests, then the reviewing attorney may be artificially lowering
the transaction costs. In other words, transaction costs or other barriers to
the transaction may in fact reflect substantial differences between the
parties' positions. To the extent that these differences are resolved because
of the reviewing attorney's flawed (irrational, self-interested, or otherwise)
decision-making process, the resulting transactions may harm the client's
interests. Certain transactions may occur because the reviewing attorney
artificially lowered the barriers to the transaction, even though the client
would have preferred for such barriers to remain (if properly explained and
understood) and the transaction not to occur.
In this sense, the reviewing attorney may be unable to serve as an
effective check on the ability of the opposing party to act opportunistically
after the contract has been formed. As described in Section IV.B supra, the
promissor faces a moral hazard to act in her personal interest (to the
detriment of the promissee) when performing the promise to the extent that
informational and control asymmetries exist between the parties. The
contract accordingly has been understood as a mechanism designed to
preclude the inclination of a promising party to shirk, hold up or otherwise
fail to perform adequately. This Article suggests that strategic drafting may
inhibit the reviewing attorney's ability to alleviate the informational and
control asymmetries that will exist between the parties after contract
formation. For example, if the contract does not allow the promissee to
monitor the promissor effectively or to control the promissor's performance
through explicit performance parameters or penalties, then the contract's
166 Gilson, supra note 1, at 244 (discussing how, under a model of distributive
bargaining, the transactional attorney's skill is in securing "a greater share of the
gain than would have been the case if the lawyers were more evenly matched").
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promises may not be performed as desired. The utility of the contract for
parties in such situations is undercut and raises the risk and cost of such
transactions.
Similarly, the reviewing attorney may be an ineffective monitoring
agent in terms of the principal-agent relationship that exists between the
two parties prior to contract formation. As I have argued elsewhere, the
party preparing the contract can be understood as the economic agent of the
opposing party with respect to the task of contract drafting.'67 As an
economic agent, the drafting party faces a moral hazard to draft the contract
in the drafting party's personal interests instead of serving the principal's
(the opposing party's) interests. Accordingly, the opposing party may
employ an attorney as an expert designed to alleviate the information and
control asymmetries that exist between the opposing parties with respect to
drafting the contract. If, however, the attorney is unable ex ante to alleviate
asymmetries because of strategic drafting as described in this Article, then
the contract may be one-sided and permit the opposing party to act
opportunistically after the contract has been executed. It may be difficult to
determine precisely what relevance, if any, the situational pressure facing
attorneys or attorneys' cognitive bias would or should have in the
adjudicative setting. Judges may be unsympathetic to an otherwise
sophisticated client's assertion that she should not be bound by a contract
because her attorney failed to represent her adequately due to the attorney's
optimism bias or reluctance to obstruct the transaction. 168 On the other hand,
such factors could be relevant in a malpractice lawsuit or an ethics inquiry.
In those situations, the adjudicator may take notice of possible cognitive
bias, moral hazard, and situational pressure for the reviewing attorney and
then determine whether the attorney acted appropriately when reviewing
the contract. 169 Without an understanding of these factors, an adjudicator
may be unable to recognize improper attorney conduct.
These issues also should be incorporated into legal ethics courses
so that law students have a better understanding of possible conflicts of
interest that can exist between the attorney and the client (even if such
conflicts do not require a formal waiver or remediation). An attorney
conscious of the moral hazard she faces when reviewing a contract will be
better positioned to represent her client's interests instead of her own.
Given the hidden nature of cognitive bias and situational pressure, law
students (and attorneys) will otherwise be unaware of how behavior is or
may be affected in the transactional setting.
167 See, e.g., E.A. Zacks, Moral Hazard, supra note 32.
168 See supra Sections III and IV for a discussion of various cognitive biases and
moral hazards.
169 See generally Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-litigation, 60 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 867 (2013)
(describing the firm structures, market forces, cognitive biases, and other
situational influences that led to questionable conduct by foreclosure law firms).
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Understanding the cognitive limitations and situational influences
that affect an attorney's review of a contract is important on a number of
levels. It helps explain or predict particular patterns of contracting behavior,
such as the tendency of contracting parties to contest which party will
prepare the initial draft of the contract. It also suggests particular limitations
on the attorney as an effective tool in checking opportunistic behavior, both
prior to and after contract formation. This is important as reforms are
considered that envision attorneys being able to alleviate one-sided
contracts or transactions. Presumably, these reforms are premised at least in
part on the idea that attorneys will be effective in reducing the ability of the
drafting party (often the party with more bargaining power) to prepare a
one-sided contract. This Article suggests, however, that attorneys may be
ineffective in doing so, and additional work should be conducted to
determine the situations in which attorneys may be deployed most
effectively. 170 Accordingly, understanding the decision-making behavior
and processes of reviewing attorneys is fundamental to an examination of
contracts and contracting behavior.
170 See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
